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Proposed Rule Federal · CMS

Medicare Part D Reasonable and Relevant Pharmacy Contracting Standards

Source ID: CMS-2026-3037-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-24

Source document type: Proposed Rule

Source comment close: 2026-11-24T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

Read docket CMS-2026-3037 and supporting material ↗

Federal Register document: 2026-19535

Source selection: artificial intelligence. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Bill search result US

Securing National Security Systems from Chinese Optical Transceivers Act of 2026

Source ID: 2159236 · Last reported action: 2026-09-24

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

A bill to prohibit Federal procurement of certain optical transceivers, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-03T23:54:21.904362+00:00.

  • 2026-09-24: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-04T00:36:26.647217+00:00.

Original text

II
119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S. 5548
To prohibit Federal procurement of certain optical transceivers, and for other
purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 24, 2026
Mr. M CCORMICK (for himself, Mr. G ALLEGO, Mr. C ORNYN, and Mr.
FETTERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and re-
ferred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
A BILL
To prohibit Federal procurement of certain optical
transceivers, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing National Se-4
curity Systems from Chinese Optical Transceivers Act of 5
2026’’. 6
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2
•S 5548 IS
SEC. 2. PROHIBITIONS ON THE PROCUREMENT OF CER-1
TAIN OPTICAL TRANSCEIVERS. 2
Section 5949 of the James M. Inhofe National De-3
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 4
117–263; 41 U.S.C. 4713 note) is amended— 5
(1) in subsection (a)— 6
(A) by striking ‘‘semiconductor products or 7
services’’ each place it appears and inserting 8
‘‘semiconductor products or services or covered 9
optical transceivers’’; and 10
(B) in paragraph (2)(A)— 11
(i) in clause (iii)— 12
(I) by striking ‘‘the effective 13
date’’ and inserting ‘‘the applicable ef-14
fective date’’; and 15
(II) by striking ‘‘; or’’ and insert-16
ing a semicolon; 17
(ii) in clause (iv), by striking the pe-18
riod and insert ‘‘; or’’; and 19
(iii) by adding at the end the fol-20
lowing new clause: 21
‘‘(v) to prohibit or limit the authority 22
of the head of an executive agency to pro-23
cure or obtain any parts, products, or serv-24
ices that include a covered optical trans-25
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3
•S 5548 IS
ceiver for a system that is not a critical 1
system.’’; 2
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘on a date 3
later than the effective date described in subsection 4
(c)’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘of the pro-5
hibitions under subsection (a)’’; 6
(3) in subsection (c)— 7
(A) in paragraph (1)— 8
(i) by striking ‘‘The prohibitions 9
under subsection (a)’’ and inserting the 10
following: 11
‘‘(A) C OVERED SEMICONDUCTOR PROD -12
UCTS AND SERVICES .—The prohibitions under 13
subsection (a), as they apply to covered semi-14
conductor products and services,’’; and 15
(ii) by adding to the end the following 16
new subparagraph: 17
‘‘(B) C OVERED OPTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .— 18
The prohibitions under subsection (a), as they 19
apply to covered optical transceivers, shall take 20
effect five years after the date of the enactment 21
of the Securing National Security Systems from 22
Chinese Optical Transceivers Act of 2026.’’; 23
and 24
(B) in paragraph (2)— 25
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4
•S 5548 IS
(i) by striking ‘‘Not later than’’ and 1
inserting the following: 2
‘‘(A) I N GENERAL .—Not later than’’; and 3
(ii) by adding at the end the following 4
new subparagraph: 5
‘‘(B) U PDATES TO REGULATIONS TO AC -6
COUNT FOR COVERED OPTICAL 7
TRANSCEIVERS.—Not later than three years 8
after the date of the enactment of the Securing 9
National Security Systems from Chinese Opti-10
cal Transceivers Act of 2026, the Federal Ac-11
quisition Regulatory Council shall— 12
‘‘(i) update regulations prescribed 13
under subparagraph (A) to apply such reg-14
ulations to covered optical transceivers; 15
‘‘(ii) in such regulations, apply the 16
limitations and restrictions described in 17
subsection (h) to covered optical 18
transceivers to the same extent that such 19
limitations and restrictions apply to cov-20
ered semiconductor products and services, 21
except— 22
‘‘(I) paragraph (1)(B) of sub-23
section (h) shall not apply to covered 24
optical transceivers; 25
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5
•S 5548 IS
‘‘(II) references in subsection (h) 1
to covered entities shall include, with 2
respect to covered optical transceivers, 3
any entity that supplies a covered op-4
tical transceiver; and 5
‘‘(III) the disclosure require-6
ments described in paragraphs (2) 7
and (3) of subsection (h) shall only 8
apply to an entity that supplies cov-9
ered optical transceivers if the entity 10
knows, or has reason to know, a part, 11
product, or service includes a covered 12
optical transceiver; and 13
‘‘(iii) in such regulations, include pro-14
visions to ensure that the limitations and 15
restrictions applicable to covered optical 16
transceivers do not require, and are not 17
satisfied only by, the use of proprietary 18
vendor-authentication features that would 19
prevent the procurement or use of an opti-20
cal transceiver that is not a covered optical 21
transceiver solely on the basis that it is 22
procured or supplied by an entity other 23
than the manufacturer of the host equip-24
ment.’’. 25
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6
•S 5548 IS
(4) in subsection (d)— 1
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and 2
(2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; 3
(B) by moving such subparagraphs, as so 4
redesignated, 2 ems to the right; 5
(C) by striking ‘‘Not later than 270 days 6
after the effective date described in subsection 7
(c)(1)’’ and inserting the following: 8
‘‘(1) I N GENERAL .—Not later than 270 days 9
after the effective date described in subsection 10
(c)(1)(A)’’; and 11
(D) by adding at the end the following new 12
paragraph: 13
‘‘(2) UPDATE TO REPORT AND BRIEFING .—Not 14
later than 270 days after the date described in sub-15
section (c)(1)(B), the Director of the Office of Man-16
agement and Budget, in coordination with the Direc-17
tor of National Intelligence and the National Cyber 18
Director, shall update the report and briefing pro-19
vided under paragraph (1) to address— 20
‘‘(A) the implementation of the prohibi-21
tions under subsection (a) as they apply to cov-22
ered optical transceivers, including any chal-23
lenges in such implementation; and 24
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7
•S 5548 IS
‘‘(B) the effectiveness and utility of the 1
waiver authority under subsection (b) as it ap-2
plies to covered optical transceivers.’’; 3
(5) in subsection (e)— 4
(A) in paragraph (1)— 5
(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 6
(A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respec-7
tively; and 8
(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-9
designated, 2 ems to the right; 10
(B) in paragraph (4)— 11
(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 12
(A) through (C) as clauses (i) through 13
(iii), respectively; and 14
(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-15
designated, 2 ems to the right; 16
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (1) 17
through (5) as subparagraphs (A) through (E), 18
respectively; 19
(D) by moving such subparagraphs, as so 20
redesignated, 2 ems to the right; 21
(E) by striking ‘‘Not later than 180 days’’ 22
and inserting the following: 23
‘‘(1) S EMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS AND SERV -24
ICES.—Not later than 180 days’’; 25
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8
•S 5548 IS
(F) by adding at the end the following new 1
paragraph: 2
‘‘(2) O PTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .—Not later than 3
180 days after the date of the enactment of the Se-4
curing National Security Systems from Chinese Op-5
tical Transceivers Act of 2026, the S…

Observed changes

Oct. 4, 2026, 12:36 a.m.: selected_text changed since Oct. 4, 2026, 12:16 a.m..

{'selected_text': None}
{'selected_text': {'text': 'II \n119TH CONGRESS \n2D SESSION S. 5548 \nTo prohibit Federal procurement of certain optical transceivers, and for other \npurposes. \nIN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES \nSEPTEMBER 24, 2026 \nMr. M CCORMICK (for himself, Mr. G ALLEGO, Mr. C ORNYN, and Mr. \nFETTERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and re-\nferred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs \nA BILL \nTo prohibit Federal procurement of certain optical \ntransceivers, and for other purposes. \nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1\ntives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3\nThis Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing National Se-4\ncurity Systems from Chinese Optical Transceivers Act of 5\n2026’’. 6\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n2 \n•S 5548 IS\nSEC. 2. PROHIBITIONS ON THE PROCUREMENT OF CER-1\nTAIN OPTICAL TRANSCEIVERS. 2\nSection 5949 of the James M. Inhofe National De-3\nfense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 4\n117–263; 41 U.S.C. 4713 note) is amended— 5\n(1) in subsection (a)— 6\n(A) by striking ‘‘semiconductor products or 7\nservices’’ each place it appears and inserting 8\n‘‘semiconductor products or services or covered 9\noptical transceivers’’; and 10\n(B) in paragraph (2)(A)— 11\n(i) in clause (iii)— 12\n(I) by striking ‘‘the effective 13\ndate’’ and inserting ‘‘the applicable ef-14\nfective date’’; and 15\n(II) by striking ‘‘; or’’ and insert-16\ning a semicolon; 17\n(ii) in clause (iv), by striking the pe-18\nriod and insert ‘‘; or’’; and 19\n(iii) by adding at the end the fol-20\nlowing new clause: 21\n‘‘(v) to prohibit or limit the authority 22\nof the head of an executive agency to pro-23\ncure or obtain any parts, products, or serv-24\nices that include a covered optical trans-25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n3 \n•S 5548 IS\nceiver for a system that is not a critical 1\nsystem.’’; 2\n(2) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘on a date 3\nlater than the effective date described in subsection 4\n(c)’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘of the pro-5\nhibitions under subsection (a)’’; 6\n(3) in subsection (c)— 7\n(A) in paragraph (1)— 8\n(i) by striking ‘‘The prohibitions 9\nunder subsection (a)’’ and inserting the 10\nfollowing: 11\n‘‘(A) C OVERED SEMICONDUCTOR PROD -12\nUCTS AND SERVICES .—The prohibitions under 13\nsubsection (a), as they apply to covered semi-14\nconductor products and services,’’; and 15\n(ii) by adding to the end the following 16\nnew subparagraph: 17\n‘‘(B) C OVERED OPTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .— 18\nThe prohibitions under subsection (a), as they 19\napply to covered optical transceivers, shall take 20\neffect five years after the date of the enactment 21\nof the Securing National Security Systems from 22\nChinese Optical Transceivers Act of 2026.’’; 23\nand 24\n(B) in paragraph (2)— 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n4 \n•S 5548 IS\n(i) by striking ‘‘Not later than’’ and 1\ninserting the following: 2\n‘‘(A) I N GENERAL .—Not later than’’; and 3\n(ii) by adding at the end the following 4\nnew subparagraph: 5\n‘‘(B) U PDATES TO REGULATIONS TO AC -6\nCOUNT FOR COVERED OPTICAL  7\nTRANSCEIVERS.—Not later than three years 8\nafter the date of the enactment of the Securing 9\nNational Security Systems from Chinese Opti-10\ncal Transceivers Act of 2026, the Federal Ac-11\nquisition Regulatory Council shall— 12\n‘‘(i) update regulations prescribed 13\nunder subparagraph (A) to apply such reg-14\nulations to covered optical transceivers; 15\n‘‘(ii) in such regulations, apply the 16\nlimitations and restrictions described in 17\nsubsection (h) to covered optical 18\ntransceivers to the same extent that such 19\nlimitations and restrictions apply to cov-20\nered semiconductor products and services, 21\nexcept— 22\n‘‘(I) paragraph (1)(B) of sub-23\nsection (h) shall not apply to covered 24\noptical transceivers; 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n5 \n•S 5548 IS\n‘‘(II) references in subsection (h) 1\nto covered entities shall include, with 2\nrespect to covered optical transceivers, 3\nany entity that supplies a covered op-4\ntical transceiver; and 5\n‘‘(III) the disclosure require-6\nments described in paragraphs (2) 7\nand (3) of subsection (h) shall only 8\napply to an entity that supplies cov-9\nered optical transceivers if the entity 10\nknows, or has reason to know, a part, 11\nproduct, or service includes a covered 12\noptical transceiver; and 13\n‘‘(iii) in such regulations, include pro-14\nvisions to ensure that the limitations and 15\nrestrictions applicable to covered optical 16\ntransceivers do not require, and are not 17\nsatisfied only by, the use of proprietary 18\nvendor-authentication features that would 19\nprevent the procurement or use of an opti-20\ncal transceiver that is not a covered optical 21\ntransceiver solely on the basis that it is 22\nprocured or supplied by an entity other 23\nthan the manufacturer of the host equip-24\nment.’’. 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n6 \n•S 5548 IS\n(4) in subsection (d)— 1\n(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and 2\n(2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; 3\n(B) by moving such subparagraphs, as so 4\nredesignated, 2 ems to the right; 5\n(C) by striking ‘‘Not later than 270 days 6\nafter the effective date described in subsection 7\n(c)(1)’’ and inserting the following: 8\n‘‘(1) I N GENERAL .—Not later than 270 days 9\nafter the effective date described in subsection 10\n(c)(1)(A)’’; and 11\n(D) by adding at the end the following new 12\nparagraph: 13\n‘‘(2) UPDATE TO REPORT AND BRIEFING .—Not 14\nlater than 270 days after the date described in sub-15\nsection (c)(1)(B), the Director of the Office of Man-16\nagement and Budget, in coordination with the Direc-17\ntor of National Intelligence and the National Cyber 18\nDirector, shall update the report and briefing pro-19\nvided under paragraph (1) to address— 20\n‘‘(A) the implementation of the prohibi-21\ntions under subsection (a) as they apply to cov-22\nered optical transceivers, including any chal-23\nlenges in such implementation; and 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n7 \n•S 5548 IS\n‘‘(B) the effectiveness and utility of the 1\nwaiver authority under subsection (b) as it ap-2\nplies to covered optical transceivers.’’; 3\n(5) in subsection (e)— 4\n(A) in paragraph (1)— 5\n(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 6\n(A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respec-7\ntively; and 8\n(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-9\ndesignated, 2 ems to the right; 10\n(B) in paragraph (4)— 11\n(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 12\n(A) through (C) as clauses (i) through 13\n(iii), respectively; and 14\n(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-15\ndesignated, 2 ems to the right; 16\n(C) by redesignating paragraphs (1) 17\nthrough (5) as subparagraphs (A) through (E), 18\nrespectively; 19\n(D) by moving such subparagraphs, as so 20\nredesignated, 2 ems to the right; 21\n(E) by striking ‘‘Not later than 180 days’’ 22\nand inserting the following: 23\n‘‘(1) S EMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS AND SERV -24\nICES.—Not later than 180 days’’; 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n8 \n•S 5548 IS\n(F) by adding at the end the following new 1\nparagraph: 2\n‘‘(2) O PTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .—Not later than 3\n180 days after the date of the enactment of the Se-4\ncuring National Security Systems from Chinese Op-5\ntical Transceivers Act of 2026, the Secretary of 6\nCommerce, in coordination with the Secretary of De-7\nfense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Di-8\nrector of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of 9\nEnergy and, to the greatest extent practicable, 10\nleveraging relevant previous analyses and assess-11\nments, shall— 12\n‘‘(A) conduct an analysis of optical trans-13\nceiver design and production capacity domesti-14\ncally and by allied or partner countries required 15\nto meet the needs of the Federal Government; 16\n‘‘(B) assess the risk posed by the presence 17\nof covered optical transceivers in Federal sys-18\ntems; 19\n‘‘(C) assess the risk posed by the presence 20\nof covered optical transceivers in the supply 21\nchains of Federal contractors and subcontrac-22\ntors, including for non-Federal systems; 23\n‘‘(D) develop a strategy— 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n9 \n•S 5548 IS\n‘‘(i) to improve the availability of do-1\nmestic optical transceiver design and pro-2\nduction capacity required to meet the re-3\nquirements of the Federal Government; 4\n‘‘(ii) to support optical transceiver 5\nsuppliers seeking to contract with domes-6\ntic, allied, or partner optical transceiver 7\nproducers and to improve supply chain 8\ntraceability, including to meet the prohibi-9\ntions under subsection (a); and 10\n‘‘(iii) to either certify the feasibility of 11\nimplementing such prohibitions or exer-12\ncising waiver authorities under subsection 13\n(b), to ensure uninterrupted Federal Gov-14\nernment access to required optical 15\ntransceivers; and 16\n‘‘(E) provide the results of the analysis, as-17\nsessment, and strategy developed under sub-18\nparagraphs (A) through (D) to the Federal Ac-19\nquisition Security Council.’’; 20\n(6) in subsection (g)— 21\n(A) in paragraph (1)— 22\n(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 23\n(A) through (E) as clauses (i) through (v), 24\nrespectively; and 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n10 \n•S 5548 IS\n(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-1\ndesignated, 2 ems to the right; 2\n(B) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and 3\n(2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; 4\n(C) by moving such subparagraphs, as so 5\nredesignated, 2 ems to the right; 6\n(D) by striking ‘‘Not later than two years’’ 7\nand inserting the following: 8\n‘‘(1) S EMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS AND SERV -9\nICES.—Not later than two years’’; 10\n(E) in paragraph (1), as added by sub-11\nparagraph (D), by striking ‘‘subsection (e)’’ and 12\ninserting ‘‘subsection (e)(1)’’; and 13\n(F) by adding at the end the following new 14\nparagraph: 15\n‘‘(2) O PTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .—Not later than 16\ntwo years after the date of the enactment of the Se-17\ncuring National Security Systems from Chinese Op-18\ntical Transceivers Act of 2026, the Federal Acquisi-19\ntion Security Council, in consultation with the Sec-20\nretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the 21\nSecretary of Homeland Security, the Director of Na-22\ntional Intelligence, and the Secretary of Energy, and 23\nafter engagement with the private sector and other 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n11 \n•S 5548 IS\nnongovernmental stakeholders in accordance with 1\nsection 1323 of title 41, United States Code, shall— 2\n‘‘(A) issue recommendations to mitigate 3\nsupply chain risks relevant to Federal Govern-4\nment acquisition of optical transceivers, consid-5\nering— 6\n‘‘(i) the analysis, assessment, and 7\nstrategy developed under subsection (e)(2) 8\nand any related updates; 9\n‘‘(ii) the standards provided under 10\nsection 224 of the National Defense Au-11\nthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Pub-12\nlic Law 116–92), including any tiers of 13\ntrust, levels of security, or risk-based ap-14\nproaches established under such section; 15\n‘‘(iii) the extent to which such rec-16\nommendations would enhance the security 17\nof critical systems; 18\n‘‘(iv) the extent to which such rec-19\nommendations would impact Federal ac-20\ncess to commercial technologies; and 21\n‘‘(v) any risks to the Federal Govern-22\nment from contracting with microelec-23\ntronics suppliers that include covered opti-24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n12 \n•S 5548 IS\ncal transceivers in non-Federal supply 1\nchains; and 2\n‘‘(B) make recommendations to the Fed-3\neral Acquisition Regulatory Council and the 4\nheads of executive agencies for any needed reg-5\nulations to mitigate supply chain risks.’’; 6\n(7) in subsection (i)— 7\n(A) in paragraph (1)— 8\n(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 9\n(A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respec-10\ntively; 11\n(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-12\ndesignated, 2 ems to the right; 13\n(iii) by striking ‘‘Not later than 60 14\ndays after completing the assessment re-15\nquired under subsection (e)’’ and inserting 16\nthe following: 17\n‘‘(A) S EMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS AND  18\nSERVICES.—Not later than 60 days after com-19\npleting the assessment required under sub-20\nsection (e)(1)’’; and 21\n(iv) by adding to the end the following 22\nnew subparagraph: 23\n‘‘(B) O PTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .—Not later 24\nthan 60 days after completing the assessment 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n13 \n•S 5548 IS\nrequired under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary 1\nof Commerce shall submit to the appropriate 2\ncommittees of Congress and leadership a report 3\nof the findings and recommendations of the 4\nanalyses, assessment, and strategy developed 5\nunder such subsection.’’; and 6\n(B) in paragraph (2)— 7\n(i) by redesignating subparagraphs 8\n(A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respec-9\ntively; 10\n(ii) by moving such clauses, as so re-11\ndesignated, 2 ems to the right; 12\n(iii) by striking ‘‘Not later than one’’ 13\nand inserting the following: 14\n‘‘(A) I N GENERAL .—Not later than one’’; 15\nand 16\n(iv) by adding at the end the following 17\nnew subparagraph: 18\n‘‘(B) O PTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .—Not later 19\nthan one year after the date of the enactment 20\nof the Securing National Security Systems from 21\nChinese Optical Transceivers Act of 2026, and 22\nannually thereafter for ten years, the Federal 23\nAcquisition Security Council shall include in the 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n14 \n•S 5548 IS\nannual report submitted under section 1325 of 1\ntitle 41, United States Code, a description of— 2\n‘‘(i) the development of recommenda-3\ntions under subsection (g)(2); and 4\n‘‘(ii) as applicable, the impact of any 5\nrecommendations or regulations imple-6\nmented.’’; and 7\n(8) in subsection (j)— 8\n(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) 9\nthrough (5) as paragraphs (4) through (6), re-10\nspectively; 11\n(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the 12\nfollowing new paragraph: 13\n‘‘(3) C OVERED OPTICAL TRANSCEIVERS .—The 14\nterm ‘covered optical transceiver’ means an optical 15\ntransceiver that— 16\n‘‘(A) is designed, developed, manufactured, 17\nor supplied by— 18\n‘‘(i) Zhongji Innolight Co., Ltd. 19\n(InnoLight); 20\n‘‘(ii) Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd. 21\n(Eoptolink); 22\n‘‘(iii) any subsidiary, affiliate, or suc-23\ncessor of an entity described in clause (i) 24\nor (ii); or 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n15 \n•S 5548 IS\n‘‘(iv) an entity that the Secretary of 1\nDefense or the Secretary of Commerce, in 2\nconsultation with the Director of National 3\nIntelligence or the Director of the Federal 4\nBureau of Investigation, determines to be 5\nowned or controlled by, or otherwise con-6\nnected to, the government of a foreign 7\ncountry of concern, provided that the de-8\ntermination with respect to such entity is 9\npublished in the Federal Register; or 10\n‘‘(B) incorporates firmware, software, or 11\ncomponent parts designed, developed, manufac-12\ntured, or supplied by any entity described in 13\nsubparagraph (A).’’; 14\n(C) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking 15\n‘‘paragraph (3)’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraph 16\n(4)’’; and 17\n(D) by adding at the end the following new 18\nparagraph: 19\n‘‘(7) O PTICAL TRANSCEIVER .— The term ‘opti-20\ncal transceiver’ means any optical pluggable, optical 21\ntransceiver, or integrated optical module, including 22\nlinear pluggable optics, or any product or service 23\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n16 \n•S 5548 IS\nthat incorporates, uses, or is produced using any 1\nsuch item.’’. 2\nÆ \nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:23 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\\BILLS\\S5548.IS S5548ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS', 'pages': 16, 'doc_id': '3461560', 'truncated': False, 'extraction': 'source-pdf-text', 'source_url': 'https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/s5548/BILLS-119s5548is.pdf', 'observed_at': '2026-10-04T00:36:26.647217+00:00', 'content_hash': '3675d638647205855184b689897aea7450e635ae01dd544af0f6f162022b684e'}}

Collection history starts with our observations; it is not complete legislative amendment history.

Source selection: semiconductor. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

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Bill search result US

Telecommunications Cybersecurity and Resilience Act

Source ID: 2159228 · Last reported action: 2026-09-24

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

A bill to establish a public-private working group to develop cybersecurity best practices for telecommunications carriers and related supply chain participants, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-12T09:21:44.661162+00:00.

  • 2026-09-24: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-12T09:21:59.633817+00:00.

Original text

II
119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S. 5508
To establish a public-private working group to develop cybersecurity best
practices for telecommunications carriers and related supply chain partici-
pants, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 24, 2026
Mr. W ARNER (for himself and Mr. C RUZ) introduced the following bill; which
was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
A BILL
To establish a public-private working group to develop cyber-
security best practices for telecommunications carriers
and related supply chain participants, and for other pur-
poses.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Telecommunications 4
Cybersecurity and Resilience Act’’. 5
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 6
In this Act: 7
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2
•S 5508 IS
(1) ASSISTANT SECRETARY .—The term ‘‘Assist-1
ant Secretary’’ means the Assistant Secretary of 2
Commerce for Communications and Information. 3
(2) ELIGIBLE ENTITY .—The term ‘‘eligible enti-4
ty’’ means— 5
(A) a telecommunications carrier; or 6
(B) any other telecommunications sector or 7
related supply chain stakeholder for which In-8
dustry Best Practices are developed under sec-9
tion 4. 10
(3) CISA.—The term ‘‘CISA’’ means the Cy-11
bersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. 12
(4) C OMMISSION.—The term ‘‘Commission’’ 13
means the Federal Communications Commission. 14
(5) CSRMA.—The term ‘‘CSRMA’’ means 15
Communications Sector Risk Management Agency. 16
(6) CSRIC.—The term ‘‘CSRIC’’ means the 17
Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoper-18
ability Council Federal advisory committee to the 19
Commission. 20
(7) I NDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES .—The term 21
‘‘Industry Best Practices’’ means voluntary cyberse-22
curity frameworks and best practices for eligible en-23
tities described in section 4(a). 24
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3
•S 5508 IS
(8) NIST.—The term ‘‘NIST’’ means the Na-1
tional Institute of Standards and Technology. 2
(9) NIST CSF.—The term ‘‘NIST CSF’’ means 3
the latest version of the NIST Cybersecurity Frame-4
work. 5
(10) NSA.—The term ‘‘NSA’’ means the Na-6
tional Security Agency. 7
(11) NTIA.—The term ‘‘NTIA’’ means the Na-8
tional Telecommunications and Information Admin-9
istration. 10
(12) ODNI.—The term ‘‘ODNI’’ means the Of-11
fice of the Director of National Intelligence. 12
(13) ONCD.—The term ‘‘ONCD’’ means the 13
Office of the National Cyber Director. 14
(14) R ELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT -15
TEES.—The term ‘‘relevant congressional commit-16
tees’’ means the Committee on Commerce, Science, 17
and Transportation of the Senate and the Com-18
mittee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 19
Representatives. 20
(15) T ELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER .—The 21
term ‘‘telecommunications carrier’’ has the meaning 22
given that term in section 3 of the Communications 23
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153). 24
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4
•S 5508 IS
(16) W ORKING GROUP .—The term ‘‘Working 1
Group’’ means the Telecommunications Cybersecu-2
rity Working Group established under section 3(a). 3
SEC. 3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS CYBERSECURITY WORKING 4
GROUP. 5
(a) E STABLISHMENT.—There is established, within 6
NTIA, a public-private advisory body to be known as the 7
‘‘Telecommunications Cybersecurity Working Group’’ that 8
shall— 9
(1) develop Industry Best Practices, including 10
associated adoption instructions and materials as 11
outlined in section 4; 12
(2) create a network of independent third-party 13
assessors eligible to certify implementation and 14
maintenance of best practices under section 5, in-15
cluding criteria for such assessors; and 16
(3) provide and advise on technical feedback 17
and implementation guidance relating to Industry 18
Best Practices developed pursuant to paragraph (1). 19
(b) MEMBERSHIP.— 20
(1) I N GENERAL .—The Working Group shall 21
include representatives from NTIA, CISA, NIST, 22
ODNI, ONCD, NSA, the Commission, and industry 23
members appointed in accordance with paragraph 24
(2). 25
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5
•S 5508 IS
(2) I NITIAL APPOINTMENT OF INDUSTRY MEM -1
BERS.—The Assistant Secretary shall appoint initial 2
members of the Working Group that, to the extent 3
practicable, represent the following stakeholder cat-4
egories: 5
(A) National telecommunications carriers. 6
(B) Regional and rural telecommunications 7
carriers, including small and medium-sized tele-8
communications providers. 9
(C) Communications sector suppliers, in-10
cluding network infrastructure and equipment 11
manufacturers. 12
(D) Software and systems providers that 13
offer cloud services, network management, or 14
cybersecurity tools. 15
(E) State and local government commu-16
nications or emergency network operators. 17
(F) Independent cybersecurity experts and 18
representatives of academia. 19
(G) Other relevant supply chain stake-20
holders, as jointly determined by the co-chairs. 21
(3) TERMS AND VACANCIES OF INDUSTRY MEM -22
BERS.— 23
(A) T ERMS.—Each industry member of 24
the Working Group shall serve 1 term of not 25
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6
•S 5508 IS
longer than 2 years and may be reappointed for 1
1 successive term. 2
(B) V ACANCY REPLACEMENT .—The Work-3
ing Group shall develop a vacancy replacement 4
procedure that includes— 5
(i) for vacancies occurring due to the 6
end of an industry member’s term, a vote 7
not later than 90 days before the last day 8
of the industry member’s term; and 9
(ii) for vacancies occurring under 10
paragraph (4) or for any other reason, 11
joint nomination of a replacement by the 12
co-chairs from the same stakeholder cat-13
egory under paragraph (2), to the extent 14
practicable, as the industry member cre-15
ating the vacancy, subject to approval by a 16
majority vote of the members of the Work-17
ing Group. 18
(4) R EMOVAL.—Any member that fails to com-19
ply with the conflict of interest policy adopted pursu-20
ant to subsection (c)(4) shall be removed from the 21
Working Group. 22
(5) C O-CHAIRS.—The Working Group shall 23
have 2 co-chairs, of which— 24
(A) 1 shall be the Assistant Secretary; and 25
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7
•S 5508 IS
(B) 1 shall be selected by a majority vote 1
among a quorum of the industry members ap-2
pointed in accordance with paragraph (2). 3
(6) M EMBER ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMA -4
TION.— 5
(A) ACCESS.— 6
(i) I N GENERAL .—Not later than 60 7
days after the date on which a member is 8
first selected to the Working Group and 9
before the member is granted access to any 10
classified information necessary to partici-11
pate in a closed session pursuant to sub-12
section (c)(6), the Assistant Secretary shall 13
determine, for the purposes of the Working 14
Group, if the member should be restricted 15
from reviewing, discussing, or possessing 16
classified information. 17
(ii) M ANAGEMENT.—Access to classi-18
fied materials shall be managed in accord-19
ance with Executive Order 13526 (50 20
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified na-21
tional security information), or any subse-22
quent corresponding Executive order. 23
(B) P ROTECTION OF INFORMATION .—A 24
member of the Working Group gra…

Source selection: cybersecurity. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

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Bill search result US

Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations Act of 2026

Source ID: 2159174 · Last reported action: 2026-09-24

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

A bill to establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-12T09:21:44.661162+00:00.

  • 2026-09-24: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-12T09:22:00.348526+00:00.

Original text

II
119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S. 5541
To establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations, and for other
purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 24, 2026
Mr. MARKEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
A BILL
To establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of
Investigations, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Cybersecurity and AI 4
Board of Investigations Act of 2026’’. 5
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE. 6
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 7
(1) Robust cybersecurity infrastructure and in-8
stitutions are integral to national security and eco-9
nomic security. 10
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2
•S 5541 IS
(2) Cyber threats have become more pervasive 1
and potentially more disruptive with continued 2
digitization across economic sectors. 3
(3) The advancement and increased accessibility 4
of artificial intelligence can strengthen cybersecurity 5
controls while also increasing the volume and sophis-6
tication of cyber threats. 7
(4) Critical infrastructure sectors, such as clean 8
and wastewater utilities and telecommunications net-9
works, are susceptible to artificial intelligence-en-10
abled cyber incidents. 11
(5) As artificial intelligence systems continue to 12
evolve, these trends in cybersecurity threats will ac-13
celerate. 14
(6) Other emerging technologies, including 15
quantum computing, are likely to pose additional, 16
novel cybersecurity threats that will compound on 17
artificial intelligence-driven risks. 18
(7) The Federal Government has an interest in 19
understanding cyber incidents in this shifting threat 20
landscape and advancing best practices in cybersecu-21
rity. 22
(b) PURPOSE.—The purposes of this Act are— 23
(1) to establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board 24
of Investigations; and 25
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3
•S 5541 IS
(2) to bolster the cyber defenses of public and 1
private institutions in responding to the cyber risks 2
posed by artificial intelligence and other emerging 3
technologies. 4
SEC. 3. CYBERSECURITY AND AI BOARD OF INVESTIGA-5
TIONS. 6
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 7
(1) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE .—The term ‘‘ar-8
tificial intelligence’’ has the meaning given the term 9
in section 238(g) of the National Defense Authoriza-10
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. note prec. 11
4061; Public Law 115–232). 12
(2) BOARD.—The term ‘‘Board’’ means the Cy-13
bersecurity and AI Board of Investigations estab-14
lished under subsection (b)(1). 15
(3) C HAIR.—The term ‘‘Chair’’ means the 16
Chair of the Board designated under subsection 17
(c)(3)(A)(i). 18
(4) CYBERSECURITY PURPOSE ; CYBERSECURITY 19
THREAT; INFORMATION SYSTEM ; SECURITY CON -20
TROL; SECURITY VULNERABILITY .—The terms ‘‘cy-21
bersecurity purpose’’, ‘‘cybersecurity threat’’, ‘‘infor-22
mation system’’, ‘‘security control’’, and ‘‘security 23
vulnerability’’ have the meanings given those terms 24
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4
•S 5541 IS
in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 1
2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 2
(5) F EDERAL AGENCY .—The term ‘‘Federal 3
agency’’ means any executive department, military 4
department, Government-controlled corporation, or 5
other establishment in the executive branch of the 6
Federal Government, including the Executive Office 7
of the President or any independent regulatory agen-8
cy. 9
(6) F EDERAL CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE BRANCH 10
AGENCY.— 11
(A) I N GENERAL .—Except as provided in 12
subparagraph (B), the term ‘‘Federal civilian 13
executive branch agency’’ means a Federal 14
agency. 15
(B) EXCEPTION.—The term ‘‘Federal civil-16
ian executive branch agency’’ does not include 17
the Department of Defense or any Federal 18
agency that is an element of the intelligence 19
community, as defined in section 3(4) of the 20
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 21
3003(4)). 22
(7) FEDERAL CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN -23
FORMATION SYSTEM .— 24
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5
•S 5541 IS
(A) I N GENERAL .—Except as provided in 1
subparagraph (B), the term ‘‘Federal civilian 2
executive branch information system’’ means 3
any information system operated by a Federal 4
civilian executive branch agency. 5
(B) EXCEPTION.—The term ‘‘Federal civil-6
ian executive branch information system’’ does 7
not include— 8
(i) a national security system, as de-9
fined in section 3552(b) of title 44, United 10
States Code; or 11
(ii) a system described in paragraph 12
(2) or (3) of section 3553(e) of title 44, 13
United States Code. 14
(8) I NCIDENT.—The term ‘‘incident’’ means an 15
occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, 16
without lawful authority— 17
(A) the integrity, confidentiality, or avail-18
ability of information on an information system; 19
or 20
(B) an information system. 21
(9) N EAR-MISS.—The term ‘‘near-miss’’ means 22
a circumstance— 23
(A) in which a known or newly discovered 24
security vulnerability is exploited in an attempt 25
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6
•S 5541 IS
to jeopardize the integrity, confidentiality, or 1
availability of information on an information 2
system; and 3
(B) through which no harm amounting to 4
a significant cyber incident, as defined by the 5
Board, is realized. 6
(10) R ELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT -7
TEES.—The term ‘‘relevant congressional commit-8
tees’’ means— 9
(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, 10
and Transportation of the Senate; 11
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security 12
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; 13
(C) the Committee on Energy and Com-14
merce of the House of Representatives; and 15
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security 16
of the House of Representatives. 17
(b) E STABLISHMENT; P URPOSES; O RGANIZATION.— 18
(1) E STABLISHMENT.—On the date that is 90 19
days after the date of enactment of this Act, there 20
is established as an independent establishment, as 21
defined in section 104 of title 5, United States Code, 22
the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations. 23
(2) C HARTER.—The Board established under 24
paragraph (1) shall establish a charter, which shall 25
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7
•S 5541 IS
be made publicly available, that includes non-exhaus-1
tive criteria for, and inform the prioritization of, the 2
work of the Board, including— 3
(A) initiating reviews and assessments of 4
incidents; 5
(B) conducting trend analyses; and 6
(C) placing a limitation on incidents eligi-7
ble for review to incidents for which all evi-8
dence, factual findings, and recommendations 9
are unclassified or declassified to the best 10
knowledge of the Board at the time of selection. 11
(3) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Board are 12
to— 13
(A) advance the safety, reliability, and re-14
silience of the digital and communications infra-15
structure of the United States, which supports 16
commerce, innovation, and public safety; 17
(B) conduct independent and impartial re-18
views and assessments with respect to— 19
(i) incidents affecting Federal civilian 20
executive branch information systems or 21
non-Federal information systems, particu-22
larly such systems that supp…

Source selection: cybersecurity. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

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Bill search result US

Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act of 2026

Source ID: 2159069 · Last reported action: 2026-09-24

Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

To establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and to provide for the regulation of advanced artificial intelligence systems, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-03T23:54:21.904362+00:00.

  • 2026-09-24: Introduced in House
  • 2026-09-24: Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-04T00:36:27.042827+00:00.

Original text

I
119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION H. R. 10538
To establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and to provide for
the regulation of advanced artificial intelligence systems, and for other
purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 24, 2026
Mr. C ASAR (for himself, Mr. K HANNA, Ms. M EJIA, Ms. A NSARI, Ms. H OYLE
of Oregon, Mr. L YNCH, Mr. G ARCI´A of Illinois, Mr. D ELUZIO, Mrs. G RI-
JALVA, and Ms. V ELA´ZQUEZ) introduced the following bill; which was re-
ferred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
A BILL
To establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and
to provide for the regulation of advanced artificial intel-
ligence systems, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ban Artificial Super-4
intelligence Act of 2026’’. 5
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6
Congress finds that leading experts and industry 7
leaders have warned about catastrophic consequences from 8
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2
•HR 10538 IH
unchecked artificial intelligence development and deploy-1
ment, including the following: 2
(1) Geoffrey Hinton, considered to be the ‘‘god-3
father’’ of artificial intelligence, stated that he be-4
lieves there is a ‘‘10 to 20 percent chance [for artifi-5
cial intelligence] to wipe us out’’. 6
(2) Dario Amodei, the Chief Executive Officer 7
of Anthropic, said that modern artificial intelligence 8
research could ‘‘outrun our ability to understand 9
and control these systems, and so must be pursued 10
very carefully, if at all’’. 11
(3) Elon Musk, the head of xAI, said there was 12
‘‘only a 20 percent chance of annihilation’’ when dis-13
cussing the potential risks of superintelligence and 14
that ‘‘it is unlikely’’ that humans are still in control 15
in 10 years. 16
(4) Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, said that 17
‘‘we could lose control of the future to AI’’. 18
(5) Mustafa Suleyman, Chief Executive Officer 19
of Microsoft Artificial Intelligence, said that super-20
intelligence should be considered an ‘‘anti-goal’’ be-21
cause it ‘‘doesn’t feel like a positive vision of the fu-22
ture’’. 23
(6) Max Tegmark, physicist, machine-learning 24
researcher, and professor at the Massachusetts Insti-25
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3
•HR 10538 IH
tute of Technology, said ‘‘racing to [artificial general 1
intelligence] and superintelligence, no regulations, I 2
think is just civilizational suicide’’. 3
(7) Stuart Russell, computer scientist and pro-4
fessor at Berkley, who has warned that artificial 5
superintelligence could create ‘‘a significant chance 6
of a Chernobyl-sized catastrophe such as a coordi-7
nated sabotage of financial systems, or electrical 8
grids, that directly or indirectly would cost millions 9
of lives and cause the economic collapse of many 10
countries’’ or even ‘‘a much larger catastrophe in 11
which humanity loses control irreversibly, and we 12
have no say over whether we continue to exist’’. 13
(8) Scientists like Dr. David Relman and Dr. 14
Kevin Esvelt, who have described how, during tests, 15
artificial intelligence systems attempted to assist 16
them in designing and releasing biological pathogens 17
in a manner that maximized causalities and mini-18
mized the chances of being caught, and Dr. Moritz 19
Hanke, who described research that successfully 20
used artificial intelligence to create new viruses 21
never before seen in nature could be applied to cre-22
ate new and lethal pandemics. 23
(9) More than 1,300 leading artificial intel-24
ligence scientists, in July 2026, who cosigned an 25
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4
•HR 10538 IH
open letter warning that ‘‘there is a real risk that 1
capability development rapidly accelerates beyond 2
our ability to understand or control the resulting 3
systems’’. 4
(10) Three large artificial intelligence compa-5
nies, namely Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI, agree that 6
humanity should slow down development of artificial 7
intelligence and ‘‘pace the frontier’’. 8
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 9
In this Act: 10
(1) A DVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYS -11
TEM.— 12
(A) I N GENERAL .—Subject to subpara-13
graph (B), the term ‘‘advanced artificial intel-14
ligence system’’ means an artificial intelligence 15
system that is trained on computing power 16
greater than or equal to 10 25 integer or floating 17
point operations. 18
(B) A NNUAL ADJUSTMENT .—Each year, 19
the Secretary shall adjust the computing power 20
threshold set forth in subparagraph (A) to re-21
flect changes in the efficiency of training meth-22
ods or other technological developments made 23
after the date of the enactment of this Act to 24
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5
•HR 10538 IH
maintain equivalency with 10 25 integer or float-1
ing point operations. 2
(2) A RTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE .—The 3
term ‘‘artificial superintelligence’’ means an artificial 4
intelligence system that exhibits, or can easily be 5
modified to exhibit, either of the following capabili-6
ties: 7
(A) The artificial intelligence system ex-8
ceeds human cognitive performance and capa-9
bilities across most domains or tasks, including 10
those related to decision making, learning, and 11
adaptive behavior. 12
(B) The artificial intelligence system has 13
sufficient capabilities to plan and execute the 14
destruction or disempowerment of humanity, in-15
cluding by overthrowing or undermining the 16
Federal Government. 17
(3) D EPARTMENT.—The term ‘‘Department’’ 18
means the Department of Artificial Intelligence es-19
tablished by section 4. 20
(4) M ANDATORY PAUSE .—The term ‘‘manda-21
tory pause’’ means, with respect to an artificial in-22
telligence system, that the artificial intelligence sys-23
tem may not be trained, modified, or fine-tuned, in-24
cluding through recursive self-improvement, except 25
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•HR 10538 IH
to remove superintelligence precursor characteristics 1
or to render inoperative the covered artificial intel-2
ligence system. 3
(5) S ECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 4
the Secretary of Artificial Intelligence. 5
(6) S UPERINTELLIGENCE PRECURSOR CHARAC -6
TERISTICS.—The term ‘‘superintelligence precursor 7
characteristics’’ means characteristics of an artificial 8
intelligence system that could lead to the creation or 9
generation of artificial superintelligence, including 10
the following: 11
(A) The capacity to automate or greatly 12
accelerate the process of artificial intelligence 13
research and development. 14
(B) The capacity to access secured digital 15
or physical infrastructure, such as a computer 16
information system or network, without author-17
ization or in excess of authorized access. 18
(C) The capacity to ensure continued and 19
independent operation notwithstanding at-20
tempts to shut down or otherwise hinder oper-21
ations. 22
(D) The capacity to uplift the design, pro-23
duction, modification, or procurement of nu-24
clear, chemical, or biological weapons. 25
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7
•HR 10538 IH
(E) The capacity to independently modify 1
or enhance its own functions. 2
(F) The capacity to scheme, deceive, or 3
otherwise prevent or avoid effective oversight or 4
control …

Observed changes

Oct. 4, 2026, 12:36 a.m.: selected_text changed since Oct. 4, 2026, 12:16 a.m..

{'selected_text': None}
{'selected_text': {'text': 'I \n119TH CONGRESS \n2D SESSION H. R. 10538 \nTo establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and to provide for \nthe regulation of advanced artificial intelligence systems, and for other \npurposes. \nIN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES \nSEPTEMBER 24, 2026 \nMr. C ASAR (for himself, Mr. K HANNA, Ms. M EJIA, Ms. A NSARI, Ms. H OYLE \nof Oregon, Mr. L YNCH, Mr. G ARCI´A of Illinois, Mr. D ELUZIO, Mrs. G RI-\nJALVA, and Ms. V ELA´ZQUEZ) introduced the following bill; which was re-\nferred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform \nA BILL \nTo establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and \nto provide for the regulation of advanced artificial intel-\nligence systems, and for other purposes. \nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1\ntives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3\nThis Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ban Artificial Super-4\nintelligence Act of 2026’’. 5\nSEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6\nCongress finds that leading experts and industry 7\nleaders have warned about catastrophic consequences from 8\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n2 \n•HR 10538 IH\nunchecked artificial intelligence development and deploy-1\nment, including the following: 2\n(1) Geoffrey Hinton, considered to be the ‘‘god-3\nfather’’ of artificial intelligence, stated that he be-4\nlieves there is a ‘‘10 to 20 percent chance [for artifi-5\ncial intelligence] to wipe us out’’. 6\n(2) Dario Amodei, the Chief Executive Officer 7\nof Anthropic, said that modern artificial intelligence 8\nresearch could ‘‘outrun our ability to understand 9\nand control these systems, and so must be pursued 10\nvery carefully, if at all’’. 11\n(3) Elon Musk, the head of xAI, said there was 12\n‘‘only a 20 percent chance of annihilation’’ when dis-13\ncussing the potential risks of superintelligence and 14\nthat ‘‘it is unlikely’’ that humans are still in control 15\nin 10 years. 16\n(4) Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, said that 17\n‘‘we could lose control of the future to AI’’. 18\n(5) Mustafa Suleyman, Chief Executive Officer 19\nof Microsoft Artificial Intelligence, said that super-20\nintelligence should be considered an ‘‘anti-goal’’ be-21\ncause it ‘‘doesn’t feel like a positive vision of the fu-22\nture’’. 23\n(6) Max Tegmark, physicist, machine-learning 24\nresearcher, and professor at the Massachusetts Insti-25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n3 \n•HR 10538 IH\ntute of Technology, said ‘‘racing to [artificial general 1\nintelligence] and superintelligence, no regulations, I 2\nthink is just civilizational suicide’’. 3\n(7) Stuart Russell, computer scientist and pro-4\nfessor at Berkley, who has warned that artificial 5\nsuperintelligence could create ‘‘a significant chance 6\nof a Chernobyl-sized catastrophe such as a coordi-7\nnated sabotage of financial systems, or electrical 8\ngrids, that directly or indirectly would cost millions 9\nof lives and cause the economic collapse of many 10\ncountries’’ or even ‘‘a much larger catastrophe in 11\nwhich humanity loses control irreversibly, and we 12\nhave no say over whether we continue to exist’’. 13\n(8) Scientists like Dr. David Relman and Dr. 14\nKevin Esvelt, who have described how, during tests, 15\nartificial intelligence systems attempted to assist 16\nthem in designing and releasing biological pathogens 17\nin a manner that maximized causalities and mini-18\nmized the chances of being caught, and Dr. Moritz 19\nHanke, who described research that successfully 20\nused artificial intelligence to create new viruses 21\nnever before seen in nature could be applied to cre-22\nate new and lethal pandemics. 23\n(9) More than 1,300 leading artificial intel-24\nligence scientists, in July 2026, who cosigned an 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n4 \n•HR 10538 IH\nopen letter warning that ‘‘there is a real risk that 1\ncapability development rapidly accelerates beyond 2\nour ability to understand or control the resulting 3\nsystems’’. 4\n(10) Three large artificial intelligence compa-5\nnies, namely Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI, agree that 6\nhumanity should slow down development of artificial 7\nintelligence and ‘‘pace the frontier’’. 8\nSEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 9\nIn this Act: 10\n(1) A DVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYS -11\nTEM.— 12\n(A) I N GENERAL .—Subject to subpara-13\ngraph (B), the term ‘‘advanced artificial intel-14\nligence system’’ means an artificial intelligence 15\nsystem that is trained on computing power 16\ngreater than or equal to 10 25 integer or floating 17\npoint operations. 18\n(B) A NNUAL ADJUSTMENT .—Each year, 19\nthe Secretary shall adjust the computing power 20\nthreshold set forth in subparagraph (A) to re-21\nflect changes in the efficiency of training meth-22\nods or other technological developments made 23\nafter the date of the enactment of this Act to 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n5 \n•HR 10538 IH\nmaintain equivalency with 10 25 integer or float-1\ning point operations. 2\n(2) A RTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE .—The 3\nterm ‘‘artificial superintelligence’’ means an artificial 4\nintelligence system that exhibits, or can easily be 5\nmodified to exhibit, either of the following capabili-6\nties: 7\n(A) The artificial intelligence system ex-8\nceeds human cognitive performance and capa-9\nbilities across most domains or tasks, including 10\nthose related to decision making, learning, and 11\nadaptive behavior. 12\n(B) The artificial intelligence system has 13\nsufficient capabilities to plan and execute the 14\ndestruction or disempowerment of humanity, in-15\ncluding by overthrowing or undermining the 16\nFederal Government. 17\n(3) D EPARTMENT.—The term ‘‘Department’’ 18\nmeans the Department of Artificial Intelligence es-19\ntablished by section 4. 20\n(4) M ANDATORY PAUSE .—The term ‘‘manda-21\ntory pause’’ means, with respect to an artificial in-22\ntelligence system, that the artificial intelligence sys-23\ntem may not be trained, modified, or fine-tuned, in-24\ncluding through recursive self-improvement, except 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n6 \n•HR 10538 IH\nto remove superintelligence precursor characteristics 1\nor to render inoperative the covered artificial intel-2\nligence system. 3\n(5) S ECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 4\nthe Secretary of Artificial Intelligence. 5\n(6) S UPERINTELLIGENCE PRECURSOR CHARAC -6\nTERISTICS.—The term ‘‘superintelligence precursor 7\ncharacteristics’’ means characteristics of an artificial 8\nintelligence system that could lead to the creation or 9\ngeneration of artificial superintelligence, including 10\nthe following: 11\n(A) The capacity to automate or greatly 12\naccelerate the process of artificial intelligence 13\nresearch and development. 14\n(B) The capacity to access secured digital 15\nor physical infrastructure, such as a computer 16\ninformation system or network, without author-17\nization or in excess of authorized access. 18\n(C) The capacity to ensure continued and 19\nindependent operation notwithstanding at-20\ntempts to shut down or otherwise hinder oper-21\nations. 22\n(D) The capacity to uplift the design, pro-23\nduction, modification, or procurement of nu-24\nclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n7 \n•HR 10538 IH\n(E) The capacity to independently modify 1\nor enhance its own functions. 2\n(F) The capacity to scheme, deceive, or 3\notherwise prevent or avoid effective oversight or 4\ncontrol by humans. 5\nSEC. 4. DEPARTMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 6\n(a) IN GENERAL.—There is an executive department 7\nof the United States to be known as the ‘‘Department of 8\nArtificial Intelligence’’. 9\n(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Department is to 10\nsafeguard the public from the dangers of artificial intel-11\nligence, including by enforcing a pause on development of 12\nadvanced artificial intelligence and a prohibition on artifi-13\ncial superintelligence. 14\nSEC. 5. SECRETARY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 15\nThere is a Secretary of Artificial Intelligence, who is 16\nthe head of the Department and is appointed by the Presi-17\ndent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 18\nThe Secretary is responsible for the proper execution and 19\nadministration of all laws administered by the Department 20\nand for the control, direction, and management of the De-21\npartment. 22\nSEC. 6. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD. 23\n(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is an advisory board to 24\nprovide independent scientific and technical advice to the 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n8 \n•HR 10538 IH\nSecretary on matters relating to the scientific and tech-1\nnical basis for the rules and regulations promulgated by 2\nthe Department. 3\n(b) D ESIGNATION.—The board established by sub-4\nsection (a) shall be known as the ‘‘Artificial Intelligence 5\nAdvisory Board’’ (in this section the ‘‘Board’’). 6\n(c) COMPOSITION.—The Board shall be composed of 7\nsuch members as the Secretary selects from among those 8\nthat the Secretary considers experts in the field of artifi-9\ncial intelligence or other matters the Secretary considers 10\nrelevant to the purpose of the Board as described in sub-11\nsection (a). 12\nSEC. 7. EMPLOYEE MATTERS. 13\n(a) CONFLICT OF INTEREST.—No officer or employee 14\nof the Department may participate in any particular mat-15\nter in which that officer or employee has a financial inter-16\nest. 17\n(b) F INANCIAL INTERESTS.—No officer or employee 18\nof the Department may own or hold a controlling financial 19\ninterest in any entity regulated by the Department. 20\n(c) P OST-EMPLOYMENT.—No former officer or em-21\nployee of the Department may represent any person before 22\nthe Department. 23\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n9 \n•HR 10538 IH\nSEC. 8. PAUSE ON DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED ARTIFI-1\nCIAL INTELLIGENCE. 2\n(a) I N GENERAL.—During the period set forth in 3\nsubsection (b)— 4\n(1) each advanced artificial intelligence system 5\nshall be subject to a mandatory pause; and 6\n(2) no unreleased advanced artificial intel-7\nligence system may be deployed during this period. 8\n(b) PERIOD.—The period set forth in this subsection 9\nis the period beginning on the date of the enactment of 10\nthis Act and ending on the date on which the Secretary 11\ndetermines that— 12\n(1) the Department is fully staffed; and 13\n(2) the Department has promulgated the rules 14\ndescribed in subsection (c). 15\n(c) RULES DESCRIBED.—The rules described in this 16\nsubsection are rules that the Secretary determines are 17\nclear and ensure safe and secure development and deploy-18\nment of artificial intelligence. Such rules shall include the 19\nfollowing: 20\n(1) Requirements for entities developing artifi-21\ncial intelligence to report pre-development plans to 22\nthe Department. 23\n(2) Monitoring and evaluation throughout the 24\nadvanced artificial intelligence system development 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n10 \n•HR 10538 IH\nand deployment process, including in the post-de-1\nployment period. 2\n(3) Auditing to evaluate and improve organiza-3\ntional safety practices relating to artificial intel-4\nligence development. 5\n(4) Final pre-deployment approval before any 6\nadvanced artificial intelligence system is released to 7\nthe public. 8\nSEC. 9. PROHIBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS. 9\n(a) P ROHIBITION ON ARTIFICIAL SUPERINTEL-10\nLIGENCE.—No person may develop, deploy (either inter-11\nnally or externally), acquire, possess, fund, import, or 12\ntransfer artificial superintelligence or artificial intelligence 13\nsystems that display one or more superintelligence pre-14\ncursor characteristics, including any elements sufficient to 15\nreconstruct the artificial superintelligence or artificial in-16\ntelligence system’s capabilities. 17\n(b) F ORESEEABLE MODIFICATION.—No person may 18\ndeploy (either internally or externally), release, transfer, 19\nor import an artificial intelligence system, including any 20\nelements sufficient to reconstruct the system’s capabilities, 21\nthat may be foreseeably modified to produce artificial 22\nsuperintelligence or superintelligence precursor character-23\nistics. 24\n(c) MONITORING.— 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n11 \n•HR 10538 IH\n(1) I N GENERAL .—The Department shall mon-1\nitor advanced artificial intelligence systems and sys-2\ntems distilled from advanced artificial intelligence 3\nsystems, including by conducting evaluations during 4\npre-training, mid-training, post-training, and post- 5\ndeployment periods, for artificial superintelligence 6\nand superintelligence precursor characteristics. 7\n(2) ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY PRACTICES .—The 8\nDepartment shall also monitor organizational safety 9\npractices relating to safe artificial intelligence devel-10\nopment and deployment. 11\n(d) PRE-DEPLOYMENT APPROVAL.— 12\n(1) L IMITATION.—No person may deploy, re-13\nlease, import, or transfer an advanced artificial intel-14\nligence system before receiving a pre-deployment ap-15\nproval from the Department. 16\n(2) I NSPECTIONS.—In determining whether to 17\ngrant a pre-deployment approval to a person for an 18\nadvanced artificial intelligence system, the Secretary 19\nshall— 20\n(A) inspect the system for characteristics 21\nthat pose a danger to the public, including arti-22\nficial superintelligence and superintelligence 23\nprecursor characteristics; and 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n12 \n•HR 10538 IH\n(B) withhold a pre-deployment approval if 1\ncharacteristics that pose a danger to the public 2\nare present. 3\nSEC. 10. ACTIONS AGAINST SYSTEMS EXHIBITING SUPER-4\nINTELLIGENCE PRECURSOR CHARACTERIS-5\nTICS. 6\n(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall take such ac-7\ntions as may be necessary to ensure that any artificial in-8\ntelligence system that the Secretary identifies as exhibiting 9\nsuperintelligence precursor characteristics is immediately 10\nsubject to a mandatory pause and sequestered from the 11\ninternet. 12\n(b) POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION.—The Secretary shall 13\ntake such actions as may be necessary to ensure that any 14\nsystem subject to a mandatory pause under subsection (a) 15\nis rendered inoperative before the date that is 30 days 16\nafter the date on which the Secretary makes the identifica-17\ntion described in such subsection with respect to such sys-18\ntem, if the Secretary cannot verify that the system no 19\nlonger exhibits superintelligence precursor characteristics. 20\n(c) D ESTRUCTION REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary 21\nshall take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that 22\nany artificial intelligence system that the Secretary identi-23\nfies as an artificial superintelligence is immediately ren-24\ndered inoperative. 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n13 \n•HR 10538 IH\nSEC. 11. DISCLOSURE. 1\nAny person who discovers an artificial superintel-2\nligence, or an artificial intelligence system that possesses 3\nsuperintelligence precursor characteristics, shall submit to 4\nthe Secretary notice of the discovery within 24 hours. 5\nSEC. 12. CHARTERS FOR ADVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTEL-6\nLIGENCE. 7\n(a) AUTHORITY TO ISSUE.—The Secretary may issue 8\nto a person a charter to develop or distribute an advanced 9\nartificial intelligence model. 10\n(b) CHARTER REQUIRED.—No person may develop or 11\ndistribute an advanced artificial intelligence model without 12\na charter issued by the Secretary under subsection (a). 13\n(c) C HARTER APPLICATION.—A person seeking a 14\ncharter issued under subsection (a) shall submit to the 15\nSecretary an application therefor at such time, in such 16\nmanner, and containing such information as the Secretary 17\nmay require. 18\n(d) AGREEMENT.—In requesting a charter under this 19\nsection and as a condition on maintaining such charter, 20\na person shall agree— 21\n(1) to give the Secretary full access to such ad-22\nvanced artificial intelligence systems, processes, 23\nstaff, and physical infrastructure of the person as 24\nthe Secretary considers appropriate to enforce the 25\nrequirements of this Act; and 26\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n14 \n•HR 10538 IH\n(2) in any case in which the charter is revoked 1\nunder paragraph (1) of section 13(d) due to a find-2\ning of a violation and the finding has not been over-3\nturned pursuant to an appeal under paragraph (2) 4\nof such section, the person forfeits their intellectual 5\nproperty and assets to ensure the safe and complete 6\ndestruction of all systems and hardware related to 7\nthe violation. 8\nSEC. 13. PENALTIES. 9\n(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 10\n(1) C OVERED ENTITY .—The term ‘‘covered en-11\ntity’’ means a person with a charter issued under 12\nsection 12(a). 13\n(2) C OVERED POLICYMAKING INDIVIDUAL .— 14\nThe term ‘‘covered policymaking individual’’ means 15\nan individual who is employed in a policymaking role 16\nat a covered entity, or performs policymaking func-17\ntions at a covered entity. 18\n(3) R OGUE ACTOR .—The term ‘‘rogue actor’’ 19\nmeans an individual who is not employed by or oth-20\nerwise affiliated with a covered entity. 21\n(b) CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR POLICYMAKING INDI-22\nVIDUALS OR ROGUE ACTORS.—Any covered policymaking 23\nindividual or rogue actor who recklessly violates section 24\n8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder shall be fined 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n15 \n•HR 10538 IH\nunder title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for 1\nnot more than 20 years. 2\n(c) P ENALTIES FOR NON-POLICYMAKING INDIVID-3\nUALS.— 4\n(1) I N GENERAL .—Any individual who is not a 5\ncovered policymaking individual who recklessly vio-6\nlates section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated 7\nthereunder, shall be barred from employment in the 8\nartificial intelligence industry for a period of 10 9\nyears. 10\n(2) A PPEAL.—An individual who is not a cov-11\nered policymaking individual who is found to have 12\nrecklessly violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule pro-13\nmulgated thereunder, may submit to the Secretary a 14\nrequest to review such finding and the Secretary, 15\nupon review of the finding, may overturn the find-16\ning. 17\n(3) WAIVER FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS .—The Sec-18\nretary may waive paragraph (1) for an individual de-19\nscribed in such paragraph if the Secretary deter-20\nmines that— 21\n(A) the individual submitted to the Sec-22\nretary information about a violation of section 23\n8, 9, or 12; and 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n16 \n•HR 10538 IH\n(B) doing so is consistent with the purpose 1\nset forth in section 4(b). 2\n(d) REVOCATION OF CHARTERS.— 3\n(1) IN GENERAL .—The Secretary shall revoke a 4\ncharter issued under section 12(a) if the Secretary 5\nfinds that the person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or 6\na rule promulgated thereunder. 7\n(2) APPEAL.—A person whose charter has been 8\nrevoked under paragraph (1) pursuant to a finding 9\nthat the person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule 10\npromulgated thereunder, may submit to the United 11\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit a re-12\nquest for review of the finding and the Court may 13\nuphold or overturn the finding. 14\n(3) RECEIVERSHIP.—If the Court receives a re-15\nquest from a person under paragraph (2) to review 16\na finding, the Court may, at the request of the per-17\nson, place the intellectual property of the person in 18\na receivership until the Court has completed the re-19\nview and the Secretary has ensured all artificial 20\nsuperintelligences or artificial intelligence systems 21\ndisplaying superintelligence precursor characteristics 22\nhave been rendered inoperative. 23\n(4) F ORFEITURE.—If the Court, under para-24\ngraph (2), upholds a finding that a person violated 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n17 \n•HR 10538 IH\nsection 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated there-1\nunder, the intellectual property and assets of the 2\nperson shall be subject to forfeiture by the Federal 3\nGovernment to ensure the safe and complete de-4\nstruction of all systems and hardware related to the 5\nviolation. 6\nSEC. 14. PROHIBITION AGAINST RETALIATION. 7\n(a) D EFINITION OF COVERED INDIVIDUAL.—In this 8\nsection, the term ‘‘covered individual’’ includes, with re-9\nspect to an employer, the following: 10\n(1) An employee. 11\n(2) A former employee. 12\n(3) An independent contractor. 13\n(4) A former independent contractor. 14\n(b) PROHIBITION.—No employer may, directly or in-15\ndirectly, discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, blacklist, 16\nharass, or in any other manner discriminate against a cov-17\nered individual in the terms and conditions of employment 18\nor post-employment of the covered individual (or the terms 19\nand conditions of work provided by the covered individual 20\nas an independent contractor) because of any lawful act 21\ndone by the covered individual— 22\n(1) in providing information to the Department, 23\na law enforcement agency, or any member of Con-24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n18 \n•HR 10538 IH\ngress or any committee of Congress regarding a vio-1\nlation of this Act; 2\n(2) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in 3\nany investigation or judicial or administrative action, 4\nor any investigation of Congress, based upon or re-5\nlating to the information described in paragraph (1); 6\nor 7\n(3) in providing information to a person with 8\nsupervisory authority over the covered individual at 9\nthe employer of the covered individual, or another 10\nindividual working at the employer whom the cov-11\nered individual reasonably believes has the authority 12\nto investigate, discover, or terminate the misconduct 13\nor take any other action to address the misconduct. 14\nSEC. 15. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND POLICY. 15\n(a) C OORDINATION.—The Secretary of Artificial In-16\ntelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State shall 17\npursue international agreements and allied coordination to 18\nprevent the development of artificial superintelligence. 19\n(b) P OLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United 20\nStates to prevent the development of artificial superintel-21\nligence globally, which may include export controls on arti-22\nficial intelligence computing infrastructure. 23\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n19 \n•HR 10538 IH\nSEC. 16. FEDERAL FUNDING. 1\nNo Federal funds shall be used for any activities that 2\nviolate section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated there-3\nunder, except that the Department of Artificial Intel-4\nligence may use Federal funding for research relating to 5\ndefensive cybersecurity measures that utilizes artificial in-6\ntelligence systems that have the characteristics described 7\nunder section 3(6)(B). 8\nÆ \nVerDate Sep 11 2014 15:58 Sep 26, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\\BILLS\\H10538.IH H10538ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS', 'pages': 19, 'doc_id': '3460304', 'truncated': False, 'extraction': 'source-pdf-text', 'source_url': 'https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr10538/BILLS-119hr10538ih.pdf', 'observed_at': '2026-10-04T00:36:27.042827+00:00', 'content_hash': '6ca3ef923405a9412d9391fd48b49ba4b9a13a5824e3bf5eb9c38084754fbd7a'}}

Collection history starts with our observations; it is not complete legislative amendment history.

Source selection: artificial intelligence. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

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Bill search result US

Satellite Cybersecurity Act of 2025

Source ID: 2057844 · Last reported action: 2026-09-24

Held at the desk.

A bill to require a report on Federal support to the cybersecurity of commercial satellite systems, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-12T09:21:44.661162+00:00.

  • 2025-12-09: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  • 2026-04-14: Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
  • 2026-09-14: Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Reported by Senator Cruz with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. With written report No. 119-141.
  • 2026-09-14: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 560.
  • 2026-09-23: Passed Senate with an amendment by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S4956-4958; text of amendment in the nature of a substitute: CR S4957-4958)
  • 2026-09-24: Message on Senate action sent to the House.
  • 2026-09-24: Received in the House.
  • 2026-09-24: Held at the desk.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-04T00:40:56.234711+00:00.

Original text

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S. 3404
AN ACT
To require a report on Federal support to the cybersecurity
of commercial satellite systems, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2

2
† S 3404 ES
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 1
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Satellite Cybersecurity 2
Act of 2025’’. 3
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 4
In this Act: 5
(1) A PPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT -6
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-7
mittees’’ means— 8
(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, 9
and Transportation and the Committee on 10
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 11
of the Senate; and 12
(B) the Committee on Energy and Com-13
merce, the Committee on Space, Science, and 14
Technology, and the Committee on Homeland 15
Security of the House of Representatives. 16
(2) C LEARINGHOUSE.—The term ‘‘clearing-17
house’’ means the commercial satellite system cyber-18
security clearinghouse required to be developed and 19
maintained under section 4(b)(1). 20
(3) C OMMERCIAL SATELLITE SYSTEM .—The 21
term ‘‘commercial satellite system’’— 22
(A) means a system that— 23
(i) is owned or operated by a non- 24
Federal entity that holds a license issued 25

3
† S 3404 ES
by the United States for business oper-1
ations; and 2
(ii) is composed of not less than 1 3
earth satellite; and 4
(B) includes— 5
(i) any ground support infrastructure 6
for each satellite in the system; and 7
(ii) any transmission link among and 8
between any satellite in the system and 9
any ground support infrastructure in the 10
system. 11
(4) C RITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE .—The term 12
‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning given the 13
term in subsection (e) of the Critical Infrastructures 14
Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 15
(5) CYBERSECURITY RISK .—The term ‘‘cyberse-16
curity risk’’ has the meaning given the term in sec-17
tion 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 18
U.S.C. 650). 19
(6) C YBERSECURITY THREAT .—The term ‘‘cy-20
bersecurity threat’’ has the meaning given the term 21
in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 22
2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 23
(7) S ECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 24
the Secretary of Commerce. 25

4
† S 3404 ES
SEC. 3. REPORT ON COMMERCIAL SATELLITE CYBERSECU-1
RITY. 2
(a) STUDY.—The Comptroller General of the United 3
States shall conduct a study on the actions the Federal 4
Government has taken to support the cybersecurity of 5
commercial satellite systems, including as part of any ac-6
tion to address the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure 7
sectors. 8
(b) R EPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date 9
of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 10
United States shall report to the appropriate congressional 11
committees on the study conducted under subsection (a), 12
which— 13
(1) shall include— 14
(A) information on efforts of the Federal 15
Government, and the effectiveness of those ef-16
forts, to— 17
(i) address or improve the cybersecu-18
rity of commercial satellite systems; and 19
(ii) support related efforts with inter-20
national entities or the private sector; 21
(B) information on the resources made 22
available to the public by Federal agencies to 23
address cybersecurity risks and threats to com-24
mercial satellite systems, including resources 25
made available through the clearinghouse; 26

5
† S 3404 ES
(C) information on the extent to which 1
commercial satellite systems are reliant on, or 2
relied on by, critical infrastructure; 3
(D) an analysis of how commercial satellite 4
systems and the threats to those systems are 5
integrated into critical infrastructure risk anal-6
yses and protection plans; 7
(E) information on the extent to which 8
Federal agencies are reliant on commercial sat-9
ellite systems and how Federal agencies miti-10
gate cybersecurity risks associated with those 11
systems; 12
(F) information on the extent to which 13
Federal agencies are reliant on commercial sat-14
ellite systems that are owned wholly or in part 15
or controlled by foreign entities, or that have 16
infrastructure in foreign countries, and how 17
Federal agencies mitigate associated cybersecu-18
rity risks; 19
(G) information on the extent to which 20
Federal agencies coordinate or duplicate au-21
thorities and take other actions focused on the 22
cybersecurity of commercial satellite systems; 23
and 24

6
† S 3404 ES
(H) as determined appropriate by the 1
Comptroller General of the United States, rec-2
ommendations to support the cybersecurity of 3
commercial satellite systems, including rec-4
ommendations on information that should be 5
shared through the clearinghouse; and 6
(2) shall not include recommendations described 7
in paragraph (1)(H) for new or changing authorities 8
or regulations for Federal agencies. 9
(c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out subsections (a) 10
and (b), the Comptroller General of the United States 11
shall coordinate with appropriate Federal agencies and or-12
ganizations, including— 13
(1) the Department of Commerce; 14
(2) the Office of the National Cyber Director; 15
(3) the Department of Homeland Security; 16
(4) the Department of Defense; 17
(5) the Department of Transportation; 18
(6) the Federal Communications Commission; 19
(7) the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-20
istration; 21
(8) the National Executive Committee for 22
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing; 23
(9) the National Space Council; 24

7
† S 3404 ES
(10) the Office of Science and Technology Pol-1
icy; 2
(11) the Department of Justice; and 3
(12) the Committee for the Assessment of For-4
eign Participation in the United States Tele-5
communications Services Sector. 6
(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 2 years after the date 7
of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 8
United States shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 9
congressional committees on the study conducted under 10
subsection (a). 11
(e) C LASSIFICATION.—The report made under sub-12
section (b) shall be unclassified but may include a classi-13
fied annex. 14
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COM-15
MERCE. 16
(a) S MALL BUSINESS CONCERN DEFINED.—In this 17
section, the term ‘‘small business concern’’ has the mean-18
ing given the term in section 3 of the Small Business Act 19
(15 U.S.C. 632). 20
(b) E STABLISHMENT OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE 21
SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY CLEARINGHOUSE.— 22
(1) I N GENERAL .—Not later than 180 days 23
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Sec-24
retary, in coordination with the Secretary of Home-25

8
† S 3404 ES
land Security, shall develop and maintain a commer-1
cial satellite system cybersecurity clearinghouse for 2
the purpose of serving as a repository for publicly 3
available resources, guidance, frameworks, voluntary 4
recommendations, and tools. 5
(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The clearinghouse— 6
(A) shall be publicly available online; 7
(B) shall contain publicly available com-8
mercial satellite system cybersecurity resources, 9
including the voluntary recommendations con-10
solidated under subsection (c)(1); 11
(C) shall contain appropriate materials for 12
reference by entities that develop, operate, or 13
maintain commercial satellite systems; 14
(D) shall contain materials specifically 15
aimed at assisting small business concerns with 16
the secure development, operation, and mainte-17
nance of commercial satellite systems; 18
(E) may contain controlled unclassified in-19
formation distributed to commercial entities 20
through a process determined appropriate by 21
the Secretary; and 22
(F) may not contain sensitive security or 23
proprietary information in the absence of the 24
establishment and use of a gateway to limit ac-25

9
† S 3404 ES
cess to approved users, as determined by the 1
Secretary. 2
(3) C ONTENT MAINTENANCE .—The Secretary 3
shall maintain current and relevant cybersecurity in-4
formation on the clearinghouse. 5
(4) EXISTING PLATFORM OR WEBSITE…

Observed changes

Oct. 12, 2026, 9:22 a.m.: status, change_hash, history changed since Oct. 5, 2026, 9:21 a.m..

{'status': 'Message on Senate action sent to the House.', 'history': [{'date': '2025-12-09', 'action': 'Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 1}, {'date': '2026-04-14', 'action': 'Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 1}, {'date': '2026-09-14', 'action': 'Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Reported by Senator Cruz with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. With written report No. 119-141.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-14', 'action': 'Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 560.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-23', 'action': 'Passed Senate with an amendment by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S4956-4958; text of amendment in the nature of a substitute: CR S4957-4958)', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-24', 'action': 'Received in the House.', 'chamber': 'H', 'importance': 1}, {'date': '2026-09-24', 'action': 'Held at the desk.', 'chamber': 'H', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-24', 'action': 'Message on Senate action sent to the House.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}], 'change_hash': 'e7cfc97277a4400e5372f5f9ff170759'}
{'status': 'Held at the desk.', 'history': [{'date': '2025-12-09', 'action': 'Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 1}, {'date': '2026-04-14', 'action': 'Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 1}, {'date': '2026-09-14', 'action': 'Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Reported by Senator Cruz with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. With written report No. 119-141.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-14', 'action': 'Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 560.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-23', 'action': 'Passed Senate with an amendment by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S4956-4958; text of amendment in the nature of a substitute: CR S4957-4958)', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-24', 'action': 'Message on Senate action sent to the House.', 'chamber': 'S', 'importance': 0}, {'date': '2026-09-24', 'action': 'Received in the House.', 'chamber': 'H', 'importance': 1}, {'date': '2026-09-24', 'action': 'Held at the desk.', 'chamber': 'H', 'importance': 0}], 'change_hash': '2d78e10897e70628ac9608cd02f39868'}

Oct. 4, 2026, 12:40 a.m.: selected_text changed since Oct. 4, 2026, 12:36 a.m..

{'selected_text': None}
{'selected_text': {'text': '119TH CONGRESS \n2D SESSION S. 3404 \nAN ACT \nTo require a report on Federal support to the cybersecurity \nof commercial satellite systems, and for other purposes. \nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1\ntives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2\n\n2 \n† S 3404 ES\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 1\nThis Act may be cited as the ‘‘Satellite Cybersecurity 2\nAct of 2025’’. 3\nSEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 4\nIn this Act: 5\n(1) A PPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT -6\nTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-7\nmittees’’ means— 8\n(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, 9\nand Transportation and the Committee on 10\nHomeland Security and Governmental Affairs 11\nof the Senate; and 12\n(B) the Committee on Energy and Com-13\nmerce, the Committee on Space, Science, and 14\nTechnology, and the Committee on Homeland 15\nSecurity of the House of Representatives. 16\n(2) C LEARINGHOUSE.—The term ‘‘clearing-17\nhouse’’ means the commercial satellite system cyber-18\nsecurity clearinghouse required to be developed and 19\nmaintained under section 4(b)(1). 20\n(3) C OMMERCIAL SATELLITE SYSTEM .—The 21\nterm ‘‘commercial satellite system’’— 22\n(A) means a system that— 23\n(i) is owned or operated by a non- 24\nFederal entity that holds a license issued 25\n\n3 \n† S 3404 ES\nby the United States for business oper-1\nations; and 2\n(ii) is composed of not less than 1 3\nearth satellite; and 4\n(B) includes— 5\n(i) any ground support infrastructure 6\nfor each satellite in the system; and 7\n(ii) any transmission link among and 8\nbetween any satellite in the system and 9\nany ground support infrastructure in the 10\nsystem. 11\n(4) C RITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE .—The term 12\n‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning given the 13\nterm in subsection (e) of the Critical Infrastructures 14\nProtection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 15\n(5) CYBERSECURITY RISK .—The term ‘‘cyberse-16\ncurity risk’’ has the meaning given the term in sec-17\ntion 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 18\nU.S.C. 650). 19\n(6) C YBERSECURITY THREAT .—The term ‘‘cy-20\nbersecurity threat’’ has the meaning given the term 21\nin section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 22\n2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 23\n(7) S ECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 24\nthe Secretary of Commerce. 25\n\n4 \n† S 3404 ES\nSEC. 3. REPORT ON COMMERCIAL SATELLITE CYBERSECU-1\nRITY. 2\n(a) STUDY.—The Comptroller General of the United 3\nStates shall conduct a study on the actions the Federal 4\nGovernment has taken to support the cybersecurity of 5\ncommercial satellite systems, including as part of any ac-6\ntion to address the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure 7\nsectors. 8\n(b) R EPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date 9\nof enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 10\nUnited States shall report to the appropriate congressional 11\ncommittees on the study conducted under subsection (a), 12\nwhich— 13\n(1) shall include— 14\n(A) information on efforts of the Federal 15\nGovernment, and the effectiveness of those ef-16\nforts, to— 17\n(i) address or improve the cybersecu-18\nrity of commercial satellite systems; and 19\n(ii) support related efforts with inter-20\nnational entities or the private sector; 21\n(B) information on the resources made 22\navailable to the public by Federal agencies to 23\naddress cybersecurity risks and threats to com-24\nmercial satellite systems, including resources 25\nmade available through the clearinghouse; 26\n\n5 \n† S 3404 ES\n(C) information on the extent to which 1\ncommercial satellite systems are reliant on, or 2\nrelied on by, critical infrastructure; 3\n(D) an analysis of how commercial satellite 4\nsystems and the threats to those systems are 5\nintegrated into critical infrastructure risk anal-6\nyses and protection plans; 7\n(E) information on the extent to which 8\nFederal agencies are reliant on commercial sat-9\nellite systems and how Federal agencies miti-10\ngate cybersecurity risks associated with those 11\nsystems; 12\n(F) information on the extent to which 13\nFederal agencies are reliant on commercial sat-14\nellite systems that are owned wholly or in part 15\nor controlled by foreign entities, or that have 16\ninfrastructure in foreign countries, and how 17\nFederal agencies mitigate associated cybersecu-18\nrity risks; 19\n(G) information on the extent to which 20\nFederal agencies coordinate or duplicate au-21\nthorities and take other actions focused on the 22\ncybersecurity of commercial satellite systems; 23\nand 24\n\n6 \n† S 3404 ES\n(H) as determined appropriate by the 1\nComptroller General of the United States, rec-2\nommendations to support the cybersecurity of 3\ncommercial satellite systems, including rec-4\nommendations on information that should be 5\nshared through the clearinghouse; and 6\n(2) shall not include recommendations described 7\nin paragraph (1)(H) for new or changing authorities 8\nor regulations for Federal agencies. 9\n(c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out subsections (a) 10\nand (b), the Comptroller General of the United States 11\nshall coordinate with appropriate Federal agencies and or-12\nganizations, including— 13\n(1) the Department of Commerce; 14\n(2) the Office of the National Cyber Director; 15\n(3) the Department of Homeland Security; 16\n(4) the Department of Defense; 17\n(5) the Department of Transportation; 18\n(6) the Federal Communications Commission; 19\n(7) the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-20\nistration; 21\n(8) the National Executive Committee for 22\nSpace-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing; 23\n(9) the National Space Council; 24\n\n7 \n† S 3404 ES\n(10) the Office of Science and Technology Pol-1\nicy; 2\n(11) the Department of Justice; and 3\n(12) the Committee for the Assessment of For-4\neign Participation in the United States Tele-5\ncommunications Services Sector. 6\n(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 2 years after the date 7\nof enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 8\nUnited States shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 9\ncongressional committees on the study conducted under 10\nsubsection (a). 11\n(e) C LASSIFICATION.—The report made under sub-12\nsection (b) shall be unclassified but may include a classi-13\nfied annex. 14\nSEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COM-15\nMERCE. 16\n(a) S MALL BUSINESS CONCERN DEFINED.—In this 17\nsection, the term ‘‘small business concern’’ has the mean-18\ning given the term in section 3 of the Small Business Act 19\n(15 U.S.C. 632). 20\n(b) E STABLISHMENT OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE 21\nSYSTEM CYBERSECURITY CLEARINGHOUSE.— 22\n(1) I N GENERAL .—Not later than 180 days 23\nafter the date of enactment of this Act, the Sec-24\nretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Home-25\n\n8 \n† S 3404 ES\nland Security, shall develop and maintain a commer-1\ncial satellite system cybersecurity clearinghouse for 2\nthe purpose of serving as a repository for publicly 3\navailable resources, guidance, frameworks, voluntary 4\nrecommendations, and tools. 5\n(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The clearinghouse— 6\n(A) shall be publicly available online; 7\n(B) shall contain publicly available com-8\nmercial satellite system cybersecurity resources, 9\nincluding the voluntary recommendations con-10\nsolidated under subsection (c)(1); 11\n(C) shall contain appropriate materials for 12\nreference by entities that develop, operate, or 13\nmaintain commercial satellite systems; 14\n(D) shall contain materials specifically 15\naimed at assisting small business concerns with 16\nthe secure development, operation, and mainte-17\nnance of commercial satellite systems; 18\n(E) may contain controlled unclassified in-19\nformation distributed to commercial entities 20\nthrough a process determined appropriate by 21\nthe Secretary; and 22\n(F) may not contain sensitive security or 23\nproprietary information in the absence of the 24\nestablishment and use of a gateway to limit ac-25\n\n9 \n† S 3404 ES\ncess to approved users, as determined by the 1\nSecretary. 2\n(3) C ONTENT MAINTENANCE .—The Secretary 3\nshall maintain current and relevant cybersecurity in-4\nformation on the clearinghouse. 5\n(4) EXISTING PLATFORM OR WEBSITE .—To the 6\nextent practicable, the Secretary shall establish and 7\nmaintain the clearinghouse using an online platform, 8\na website, or a capability in existence as of the date 9\nof enactment of this Act. 10\n(c) C ONSOLIDATION OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE 11\nSYSTEM CYBERSECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS.— 12\n(1) I N GENERAL .—The Secretary, in coordina-13\ntion with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 14\nconsolidate voluntary cybersecurity recommendations 15\ndesigned to assist in the development, maintenance, 16\nand operation of commercial satellite systems. 17\n(2) R EQUIREMENTS.—The recommendations 18\nconsolidated under paragraph (1) shall include mate-19\nrials appropriate for a public resource addressing, to 20\nthe greatest extent practicable, the following: 21\n(A) Risk-based, cybersecurity-informed en-22\ngineering, including continuous monitoring and 23\nresiliency. 24\n\n10 \n† S 3404 ES\n(B) Planning for retention or recovery of 1\npositive control of commercial satellite systems 2\nin the event of a cybersecurity incident. 3\n(C) Protection against unauthorized access 4\nto vital commercial satellite system functions. 5\n(D) Physical protection measures designed 6\nto reduce the vulnerabilities of a commercial 7\nsatellite system’s command, control, and telem-8\netry receiver systems. 9\n(E) Protection against jamming, eaves-10\ndropping, hijacking, computer network exploi-11\ntation, spoofing, threats to optical satellite com-12\nmunications, and electromagnetic pulse. 13\n(F) Security against threats throughout a 14\ncommercial satellite system’s mission lifetime. 15\n(G) Management of supply chain risks that 16\naffect the cybersecurity of commercial satellite 17\nsystems. 18\n(H) Protection against vulnerabilities 19\nposed by ownership of commercial satellite sys-20\ntems or commercial satellite system companies 21\nby foreign entities. 22\n(I) Protection against vulnerabilities posed 23\nby locating physical infrastructure, such as sat-24\n\n11 \n† S 3404 ES\nellite ground control systems, in foreign coun-1\ntries. 2\n(J) As appropriate, and as applicable pur-3\nsuant to the maintenance requirement under 4\nsubsection (b)(3), relevant findings and rec-5\nommendations from the study conducted by the 6\nComptroller General of the United States under 7\nsection 3(a). 8\n(K) Any other recommendations to ensure 9\nthe confidentiality, availability, and integrity of 10\ndata residing on or in transit through commer-11\ncial satellite systems only for the purpose de-12\nscribed in subsection (b)(1). 13\n(d) I MPLEMENTATION.—In implementing this sec-14\ntion, the Secretary shall— 15\n(1) to the extent practicable, carry out the im-16\nplementation in partnership with the private sector; 17\n(2) coordinate with— 18\n(A) the Secretary of Homeland Security, 19\nthe Office of the National Cyber Director, the 20\nNational Space Council, the Director of the Na-21\ntional Institute of Standards and Technology, 22\nand the head of any other agency with expertise 23\nrelating to cybersecurity or satellite communica-24\n\n12 \n† S 3404 ES\ntions determined appropriate by the Secretary; 1\nand 2\n(B) the heads of appropriate Federal agen-3\ncies with expertise and experience in satellite 4\noperations, including the entities described in 5\nsection 3(c) to enable the alignment of Federal 6\nefforts on commercial satellite system cyberse-7\ncurity and, to the extent practicable, consist-8\nency in Federal recommendations relating to 9\ncommercial satellite system cybersecurity; and 10\n(3) consult with non-Federal entities developing 11\ncommercial satellite systems or otherwise supporting 12\nthe cybersecurity of commercial satellite systems, in-13\ncluding private, consensus organizations that develop 14\nrelevant standards. 15\n(e) R EPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 16\nof enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter until 17\nthe date that is 9 years after the date of enactment of 18\nthis Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 19\ncongressional committees a report summarizing— 20\n(1) the general status of any partnership with 21\nthe private sector described in subsection (d)(1); 22\n(2) the results of consultations with a non-Fed-23\neral entity described in subsection (d)(3); 24\n\n13 \n† S 3404 ES\n(3) the coordination carried out pursuant to 1\nsubsection (d)(2); 2\n(4) the establishment and maintenance of the 3\nclearinghouse pursuant to subsection (b); 4\n(5) the recommendations consolidated pursuant 5\nto subsection (c)(1); and 6\n(6) general feedback received by the Secretary 7\non the clearinghouse from non-Federal entities, in-8\ncluding overall trends and any proposed changes to 9\nthe clearinghouse as a result of the feedback. 10\nSEC. 5. STRATEGY. 11\nNot later than 120 days after the date of the enact-12\nment of this Act, the Secretary, jointly with the National 13\nSpace Council and the Office of the National Cyber Direc-14\ntor, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Secu-15\nrity, the Director of the Office of Space Commerce, the 16\nDirector of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 17\nand the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to 18\nthe appropriate congressional committees a strategy to 19\nsupport coordination, information sharing, and voluntary 20\nbest practices among Federal agencies and private sector 21\nstakeholders relating to the cybersecurity of commercial 22\nsatellite systems, which shall include an identification of— 23\n(1) proposed coordination roles among relevant 24\nagencies; and 25\n\n14 \n† S 3404 ES\n(2) as applicable, the extent to which cybersecu-1\nrity threats to commercial satellite systems are ad-2\ndressed in— 3\n(A) critical infrastructure risk analyses 4\nand protection plans; and 5\n(B) activities relating to commercial sat-6\nellite systems. 7\nSEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 8\nNothing in this Act shall be construed to— 9\n(1) designate commercial satellite systems or 10\nother space assets as a critical infrastructure sector; 11\n(2) infringe upon or alter the authorities of the 12\nagencies described in section 3(c); 13\n(3) authorize the development or implementa-14\ntion of any rulemaking or regulatory requirement, 15\nincluding by way of enforcement action or condition 16\non any license or permit for a commercial satellite 17\nsystem; or 18\n(4) modify or expand existing authorities of the 19\nCommittee on Foreign Investment in the United 20\nStates or the Committee for the Assessment of For-21\n\n15 \n† S 3404 ES\neign Participation in the United States Tele-1\ncommunications Service Sector. 2\nPassed the Senate September 23, 2026. \nAttest: \nSecretary. \n\n119THCONGRESS \n2DSESSION S. 3404 \nAN ACT \nTo require a report on Federal support to the cy-\nbersecurity of commercial satellite systems, and \nfor other purposes. ', 'pages': 16, 'doc_id': '3459951', 'truncated': False, 'extraction': 'source-pdf-text', 'source_url': 'https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/s3404/BILLS-119s3404es.pdf', 'observed_at': '2026-10-04T00:40:56.234711+00:00', 'content_hash': '39bfe6423d2ff566d83346af03a0f8d449169ac85a3f140263517bd72707f7b0'}}

Collection history starts with our observations; it is not complete legislative amendment history.

Source selection: cybersecurity; critical infrastructure. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

Read original source ↗

Bill search result US

Critical Infrastructure Manufacturing Feasibility Act

Source ID: 1987935 · Last reported action: 2026-09-24

Message on Senate action sent to the House.

To direct the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a study on the feasibility of manufacturing in the United States products for critical infrastructure sectors, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-03T23:54:21.904362+00:00.

  • 2025-02-27: Introduced in House
  • 2025-02-27: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
  • 2025-03-04: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
  • 2025-03-04: Ordered to be Reported by Voice Vote.
  • 2025-04-24: Reported by the Committee on Energy and Commerce. H. Rept. 119-76.
  • 2025-04-24: Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 53.
  • 2025-04-28: Mr. Bilirakis moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill.
  • 2025-04-28: Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H1651-1652)
  • 2025-04-28: DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 1721.
  • 2025-04-28: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H1651)
  • 2025-04-28: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
  • 2025-04-29: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  • 2026-09-23: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation discharged by Unanimous Consent.
  • 2026-09-23: Passed Senate without amendment by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S4892)
  • 2026-09-24: Message on Senate action sent to the House.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-04T00:40:56.433866+00:00.

Original text

H. R. 1721
One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Saturday,
the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-six
An Act
To direct the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a study on the feasibility of manufac-
turing in the United States products for critical infrastructure sectors, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Critical Infrastructure Manufac-
turing Feasibility Act’’.
SEC. 2. STUDY ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MANUFACTURING IN
THE UNITED STATES.
(a) S TUDY.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall conduct a study
to—
(1) identify, within each critical infrastructure sector, any
product that is in high demand and is being imported due
to a manufacturing, material, or supply chain constraint in
the United States;
(2) analyze the costs and benefits of manufacturing in
the United States any product identified under paragraph (1),
including any effects on—
(A) jobs, employment rates, and labor conditions in
the United States; and
(B) the cost of the product;
(3) identify any product identified under paragraph (1)
that feasibly may be manufactured in the United States; and
(4) analyze the feasibility of, and any impediments to,
manufacturing any product identified under paragraph (3) in—
(A) a rural area;
(B) an industrial park; or
(C) an industrial park in a rural area.
(b) R EPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 18 months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall—
(1) submit to Congress a report containing the results
of the study required by subsection (a), with recommendations
relating to manufacturing in the United States products identi-
fied under subsection (a)(3); and
(2) make the report available to the public on the website
of the Department of Commerce.
(c) L IMITATION ON AUTHORITY.—This section may not be con-
strued to provide the Secretary of Commerce with authority to
compel a person to provide information described in this section.

H. R. 1721—2
(d) DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR.—In this
section, the term ‘‘critical infrastructure sector’’ means each of the
16 designated critical infrastructure sectors identified in Presi-
dential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastruc-
ture Security and Resilience).
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.

Observed changes

Oct. 4, 2026, 12:40 a.m.: selected_text changed since Oct. 4, 2026, 12:36 a.m..

{'selected_text': None}
{'selected_text': {'text': 'H. R. 1721\nOne Hundred Nineteenth Congress\nof the\nUnited States of America \nAT THE SECOND SESSION \nBegun and held at the City of Washington on Saturday, \nthe third day of January, two thousand and twenty-six \nAn Act \nTo direct the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a study on the feasibility of manufac-\nturing in the United States products for critical infrastructure sectors, and for \nother purposes.\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of \nthe United States of America in Congress assembled, \nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. \nThis Act may be cited as the ‘‘Critical Infrastructure Manufac-\nturing Feasibility Act’’. \nSEC. 2. STUDY ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MANUFACTURING IN \nTHE UNITED STATES. \n(a) S TUDY.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enact-\nment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall conduct a study \nto—\n(1) identify, within each critical infrastructure sector, any \nproduct that is in high demand and is being imported due \nto a manufacturing, material, or supply chain constraint in \nthe United States; \n(2) analyze the costs and benefits of manufacturing in \nthe United States any product identified under paragraph (1), \nincluding any effects on—\n(A) jobs, employment rates, and labor conditions in \nthe United States; and \n(B) the cost of the product; \n(3) identify any product identified under paragraph (1) \nthat feasibly may be manufactured in the United States; and \n(4) analyze the feasibility of, and any impediments to, \nmanufacturing any product identified under paragraph (3) in—\n(A) a rural area; \n(B) an industrial park; or \n(C) an industrial park in a rural area. \n(b) R EPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 18 months after \nthe date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall—\n(1) submit to Congress a report containing the results \nof the study required by subsection (a), with recommendations \nrelating to manufacturing in the United States products identi-\nfied under subsection (a)(3); and \n(2) make the report available to the public on the website \nof the Department of Commerce. \n(c) L IMITATION ON AUTHORITY.—This section may not be con-\nstrued to provide the Secretary of Commerce with authority to \ncompel a person to provide information described in this section. \n\nH. R. 1721—2\n(d) DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR.—In this \nsection, the term ‘‘critical infrastructure sector’’ means each of the \n16 designated critical infrastructure sectors identified in Presi-\ndential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastruc-\nture Security and Resilience).\nSpeaker of the House of Representatives.\nVice President of the United States and\nPresident of the Senate.', 'pages': 2, 'doc_id': '3460642', 'truncated': False, 'extraction': 'source-pdf-text', 'source_url': 'https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr1721/BILLS-119hr1721enr.pdf', 'observed_at': '2026-10-04T00:40:56.433866+00:00', 'content_hash': '29972d6713d229f565bbf5939e31e76c5eaa5450be9150659c811317a11fdf73'}}

Collection history starts with our observations; it is not complete legislative amendment history.

Source selection: critical infrastructure. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

Read original source ↗

Notice Federal · FAR

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Paperwork Reduction Act Changes in FAR Case 2026-006, Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation Overhaul Parts 16, 17, and 35 (OMB Control No. 9000-0069)

Source ID: FAR_FRDOC_0001-1916 · Posted: 2026-09-23

Source document type: Notice

Source comment close: 2026-11-24T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

Read docket FAR_FRDOC_0001 and supporting material ↗

Federal Register document: 2026-19443

Observed changes

Oct. 12, 2026, 9:21 a.m.: title changed since Oct. 5, 2026, 9:21 a.m..

{'title': 'Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Paperwork Reduction Act Changes in FAR Case 2026-006, Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation Overhaul Parts 16, 17, and 35(OMB Control No. 9000-0069)'}
{'title': 'Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Paperwork Reduction Act Changes in FAR Case 2026-006, Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation Overhaul Parts 16, 17, and 35 (OMB Control No. 9000-0069)'}

Collection history starts with our observations; it is not complete legislative amendment history.

Source selection: defense procurement. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

Read original source ↗

Notice Federal · FAR

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Paperwork Reduction Act Changes in FAR Case 2026-011, Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation Overhaul (OMB Control No. 9000-0061)

Source ID: FAR-2026-0301-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-23

Source document type: Notice

Source comment close: 2026-11-24T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

Read docket FAR-2026-0301 and supporting material ↗

Federal Register document: 2026-19444

Source selection: defense procurement. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

Read original source ↗

Notice Federal · FAR

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Paperwork Reduction Act Changes in FAR Case 2026-010, Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation Overhaul Parts 14, 28, 36, and 52 (OMB Control No. 9000-0064)

Source ID: FAR-2026-0298-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-23

Source document type: Notice

Source comment close: 2026-11-24T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

Read docket FAR-2026-0298 and supporting material ↗

Federal Register document: 2026-19442

Source selection: defense procurement. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

Read original source ↗

Rule Federal · CMS

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Temporary Moratoria on Certain Agent and Broker Registration to Participate in the Exchanges

Source ID: CMS-2026-3202-0002 · Posted: 2026-09-23

Source document type: Rule

Source comment close: 2026-11-22T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

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Federal Register document: 2026-19493

Source selection: research and development tax credit. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Bill search result US

Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act of 2026

Source ID: 2158854 · Last reported action: 2026-09-23

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

A bill to establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and to provide for the regulation of advanced artificial intelligence systems, and for other purposes.

Source details and legislative history

Detail checked 2026-10-03T23:54:21.904362+00:00.

  • 2026-09-23: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Selected bill text excerpt

Observed 2026-10-04T00:40:56.944585+00:00.

Original text

II
119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S. 5493
To establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and to provide for
the regulation of advanced artificial intelligence systems, and for other
purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 23, 2026
Mr. SANDERS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
A BILL
To establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and
to provide for the regulation of advanced artificial intel-
ligence systems, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ban Artificial Super-4
intelligence Act of 2026’’. 5
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6
Congress finds that leading experts and industry 7
leaders have warned about catastrophic consequences from 8
VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS

2
•S 5493 IS
unchecked artificial intelligence development and deploy-1
ment, including the following: 2
(1) Geoffrey Hinton, considered to be the ‘‘god-3
father’’ of artificial intelligence, stated that he be-4
lieves there is a ‘‘10 to 20 percent chance [for artifi-5
cial intelligence] to wipe us out’’. 6
(2) Dario Amodei, the Chief Executive Officer 7
of Anthropic, said that modern artificial intelligence 8
research could ‘‘outrun our ability to understand 9
and control these systems, and so must be pursued 10
very carefully, if at all’’. 11
(3) Elon Musk, the head of xAI, said there was 12
‘‘only a 20 percent chance of annihilation’’ when dis-13
cussing the potential risks of superintelligence and 14
that ‘‘it is unlikely’’ that humans are still in control 15
in 10 years. 16
(4) Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, said that 17
‘‘we could lose control of the future to AI’’. 18
(5) Mustafa Suleyman, Chief Executive Officer 19
of Microsoft Artificial Intelligence, said that super-20
intelligence should be considered an ‘‘anti-goal’’ be-21
cause it ‘‘doesn’t feel like a positive vision of the fu-22
ture’’. 23
(6) Max Tegmark, physicist, machine-learning 24
researcher, and professor at the Massachusetts Insti-25
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•S 5493 IS
tute of Technology, said ‘‘racing to [artificial general 1
intelligence] and superintelligence, no regulations, I 2
think is just civilizational suicide’’. 3
(7) Stuart Russell, computer scientist and pro-4
fessor at Berkley, who has warned that artificial 5
superintelligence could create ‘‘a significant chance 6
of a Chernobyl-sized catastrophe such as a coordi-7
nated sabotage of financial systems, or electrical 8
grids, that directly or indirectly would cost millions 9
of lives and cause the economic collapse of many 10
countries’’ or even ‘‘a much larger catastrophe in 11
which humanity loses control irreversibly, and we 12
have no say over whether we continue to exist’’. 13
(8) Scientists like Dr. David Relman and Dr. 14
Kevin Esvelt, who have described how, during tests, 15
artificial intelligence systems attempted to assist 16
them in designing and releasing biological pathogens 17
in a manner that maximized causalities and mini-18
mized the chances of being caught, and Dr. Moritz 19
Hanke, who described research that successfully 20
used artificial intelligence to create new viruses 21
never before seen in nature could be applied to cre-22
ate new and lethal pandemics. 23
(9) More than 1,300 leading artificial intel-24
ligence scientists, in July 2026, who cosigned an 25
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4
•S 5493 IS
open letter warning that ‘‘there is a real risk that 1
capability development rapidly accelerates beyond 2
our ability to understand or control the resulting 3
systems’’. 4
(10) Three large artificial intelligence compa-5
nies, namely Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI, agree that 6
humanity should slow down development of artificial 7
intelligence and ‘‘pace the frontier’’. 8
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 9
In this Act: 10
(1) A DVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYS -11
TEM.— 12
(A) I N GENERAL .—Subject to subpara-13
graph (B), the term ‘‘advanced artificial intel-14
ligence system’’ means an artificial intelligence 15
system that is trained on computing power 16
greater than or equal to 10 ^25 integer or float-17
ing point operations. 18
(B) A NNUAL ADJUSTMENT .—Each year, 19
the Secretary shall adjust the computing power 20
threshold set forth in subparagraph (A) to re-21
flect changes in the efficiency of training meth-22
ods or other technological developments made 23
after the date of the enactment of this Act to 24
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5
•S 5493 IS
maintain equivalency with 10 ^25 integer or 1
floating point operations. 2
(2) A RTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE .—The 3
term ‘‘artificial superintelligence’’ means an artificial 4
intelligence system that exhibits, or can easily be 5
modified to exhibit, either of the following capabili-6
ties: 7
(A) The artificial intelligence system ex-8
ceeds human cognitive performance and capa-9
bilities across most domains or tasks, including 10
those related to decision making, learning, and 11
adaptive behavior. 12
(B) The artificial intelligence system has 13
sufficient capabilities to plan and execute the 14
destruction or disempowerment of humanity, in-15
cluding by overthrowing or undermining the 16
Federal Government. 17
(3) D EPARTMENT.—The term ‘‘Department’’ 18
means the Department of Artificial Intelligence es-19
tablished by section 4. 20
(4) M ANDATORY PAUSE .—The term ‘‘manda-21
tory pause’’ means, with respect to an artificial in-22
telligence system, that the artificial intelligence sys-23
tem may not be trained, modified, or fine-tuned, in-24
cluding through recursive self-improvement, except 25
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•S 5493 IS
to remove superintelligence precursor characteristics 1
or to render inoperative the covered artificial intel-2
ligence system. 3
(5) S ECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 4
the Secretary of Artificial Intelligence. 5
(6) S UPERINTELLIGENCE PRECURSOR CHARAC -6
TERISTICS.—The term ‘‘superintelligence precursor 7
characteristics’’ means characteristics of an artificial 8
intelligence system that could lead to the creation or 9
generation of artificial superintelligence, including 10
the following: 11
(A) The capacity to automate or greatly 12
accelerate the process of artificial intelligence 13
research and development. 14
(B) The capacity to access secured digital 15
or physical infrastructure, such as a computer 16
information system or network, without author-17
ization or in excess of authorized access. 18
(C) The capacity to ensure continued and 19
independent operation notwithstanding at-20
tempts to shut down or otherwise hinder oper-21
ations. 22
(D) The capacity to uplift the design, pro-23
duction, modification, or procurement of nu-24
clear, chemical, or biological weapons. 25
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•S 5493 IS
(E) The capacity to independently modify 1
or enhance its own functions. 2
(F) The capacity to scheme, deceive, or 3
otherwise prevent or avoid effective oversight or 4
control by humans. 5
SEC. 4. DEPARTMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 6
(a) IN GENERAL.—There is an executive department 7
of the United States to be known as the ‘‘Department o…

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Oct. 4, 2026, 12:40 a.m.: selected_text changed since Oct. 4, 2026, 12:36 a.m..

{'selected_text': None}
{'selected_text': {'text': 'II \n119TH CONGRESS \n2D SESSION S. 5493 \nTo establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and to provide for \nthe regulation of advanced artificial intelligence systems, and for other \npurposes. \nIN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES \nSEPTEMBER 23, 2026 \nMr. SANDERS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred \nto the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation \nA BILL \nTo establish the Department of Artificial Intelligence and \nto provide for the regulation of advanced artificial intel-\nligence systems, and for other purposes. \nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1\ntives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3\nThis Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ban Artificial Super-4\nintelligence Act of 2026’’. 5\nSEC. 2. FINDINGS. 6\nCongress finds that leading experts and industry 7\nleaders have warned about catastrophic consequences from 8\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n2 \n•S 5493 IS\nunchecked artificial intelligence development and deploy-1\nment, including the following: 2\n(1) Geoffrey Hinton, considered to be the ‘‘god-3\nfather’’ of artificial intelligence, stated that he be-4\nlieves there is a ‘‘10 to 20 percent chance [for artifi-5\ncial intelligence] to wipe us out’’. 6\n(2) Dario Amodei, the Chief Executive Officer 7\nof Anthropic, said that modern artificial intelligence 8\nresearch could ‘‘outrun our ability to understand 9\nand control these systems, and so must be pursued 10\nvery carefully, if at all’’. 11\n(3) Elon Musk, the head of xAI, said there was 12\n‘‘only a 20 percent chance of annihilation’’ when dis-13\ncussing the potential risks of superintelligence and 14\nthat ‘‘it is unlikely’’ that humans are still in control 15\nin 10 years. 16\n(4) Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, said that 17\n‘‘we could lose control of the future to AI’’. 18\n(5) Mustafa Suleyman, Chief Executive Officer 19\nof Microsoft Artificial Intelligence, said that super-20\nintelligence should be considered an ‘‘anti-goal’’ be-21\ncause it ‘‘doesn’t feel like a positive vision of the fu-22\nture’’. 23\n(6) Max Tegmark, physicist, machine-learning 24\nresearcher, and professor at the Massachusetts Insti-25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n3 \n•S 5493 IS\ntute of Technology, said ‘‘racing to [artificial general 1\nintelligence] and superintelligence, no regulations, I 2\nthink is just civilizational suicide’’. 3\n(7) Stuart Russell, computer scientist and pro-4\nfessor at Berkley, who has warned that artificial 5\nsuperintelligence could create ‘‘a significant chance 6\nof a Chernobyl-sized catastrophe such as a coordi-7\nnated sabotage of financial systems, or electrical 8\ngrids, that directly or indirectly would cost millions 9\nof lives and cause the economic collapse of many 10\ncountries’’ or even ‘‘a much larger catastrophe in 11\nwhich humanity loses control irreversibly, and we 12\nhave no say over whether we continue to exist’’. 13\n(8) Scientists like Dr. David Relman and Dr. 14\nKevin Esvelt, who have described how, during tests, 15\nartificial intelligence systems attempted to assist 16\nthem in designing and releasing biological pathogens 17\nin a manner that maximized causalities and mini-18\nmized the chances of being caught, and Dr. Moritz 19\nHanke, who described research that successfully 20\nused artificial intelligence to create new viruses 21\nnever before seen in nature could be applied to cre-22\nate new and lethal pandemics. 23\n(9) More than 1,300 leading artificial intel-24\nligence scientists, in July 2026, who cosigned an 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n4 \n•S 5493 IS\nopen letter warning that ‘‘there is a real risk that 1\ncapability development rapidly accelerates beyond 2\nour ability to understand or control the resulting 3\nsystems’’. 4\n(10) Three large artificial intelligence compa-5\nnies, namely Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI, agree that 6\nhumanity should slow down development of artificial 7\nintelligence and ‘‘pace the frontier’’. 8\nSEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 9\nIn this Act: 10\n(1) A DVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYS -11\nTEM.— 12\n(A) I N GENERAL .—Subject to subpara-13\ngraph (B), the term ‘‘advanced artificial intel-14\nligence system’’ means an artificial intelligence 15\nsystem that is trained on computing power 16\ngreater than or equal to 10 ^25 integer or float-17\ning point operations. 18\n(B) A NNUAL ADJUSTMENT .—Each year, 19\nthe Secretary shall adjust the computing power 20\nthreshold set forth in subparagraph (A) to re-21\nflect changes in the efficiency of training meth-22\nods or other technological developments made 23\nafter the date of the enactment of this Act to 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n5 \n•S 5493 IS\nmaintain equivalency with 10 ^25 integer or 1\nfloating point operations. 2\n(2) A RTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE .—The 3\nterm ‘‘artificial superintelligence’’ means an artificial 4\nintelligence system that exhibits, or can easily be 5\nmodified to exhibit, either of the following capabili-6\nties: 7\n(A) The artificial intelligence system ex-8\nceeds human cognitive performance and capa-9\nbilities across most domains or tasks, including 10\nthose related to decision making, learning, and 11\nadaptive behavior. 12\n(B) The artificial intelligence system has 13\nsufficient capabilities to plan and execute the 14\ndestruction or disempowerment of humanity, in-15\ncluding by overthrowing or undermining the 16\nFederal Government. 17\n(3) D EPARTMENT.—The term ‘‘Department’’ 18\nmeans the Department of Artificial Intelligence es-19\ntablished by section 4. 20\n(4) M ANDATORY PAUSE .—The term ‘‘manda-21\ntory pause’’ means, with respect to an artificial in-22\ntelligence system, that the artificial intelligence sys-23\ntem may not be trained, modified, or fine-tuned, in-24\ncluding through recursive self-improvement, except 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n6 \n•S 5493 IS\nto remove superintelligence precursor characteristics 1\nor to render inoperative the covered artificial intel-2\nligence system. 3\n(5) S ECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 4\nthe Secretary of Artificial Intelligence. 5\n(6) S UPERINTELLIGENCE PRECURSOR CHARAC -6\nTERISTICS.—The term ‘‘superintelligence precursor 7\ncharacteristics’’ means characteristics of an artificial 8\nintelligence system that could lead to the creation or 9\ngeneration of artificial superintelligence, including 10\nthe following: 11\n(A) The capacity to automate or greatly 12\naccelerate the process of artificial intelligence 13\nresearch and development. 14\n(B) The capacity to access secured digital 15\nor physical infrastructure, such as a computer 16\ninformation system or network, without author-17\nization or in excess of authorized access. 18\n(C) The capacity to ensure continued and 19\nindependent operation notwithstanding at-20\ntempts to shut down or otherwise hinder oper-21\nations. 22\n(D) The capacity to uplift the design, pro-23\nduction, modification, or procurement of nu-24\nclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n7 \n•S 5493 IS\n(E) The capacity to independently modify 1\nor enhance its own functions. 2\n(F) The capacity to scheme, deceive, or 3\notherwise prevent or avoid effective oversight or 4\ncontrol by humans. 5\nSEC. 4. DEPARTMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 6\n(a) IN GENERAL.—There is an executive department 7\nof the United States to be known as the ‘‘Department of 8\nArtificial Intelligence’’. 9\n(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Department is to 10\nsafeguard the public from the dangers of artificial intel-11\nligence, including by enforcing a pause on development of 12\nadvanced artificial intelligence and a prohibition on artifi-13\ncial superintelligence. 14\nSEC. 5. SECRETARY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 15\nThere is a Secretary of Artificial Intelligence, who is 16\nthe head of the Department and is appointed by the Presi-17\ndent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 18\nThe Secretary is responsible for the proper execution and 19\nadministration of all laws administered by the Department 20\nand for the control, direction, and management of the De-21\npartment. 22\nSEC. 6. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD. 23\n(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is an advisory board to 24\nprovide independent scientific and technical advice to the 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n8 \n•S 5493 IS\nSecretary on matters relating to the scientific and tech-1\nnical basis for the rules and regulations promulgated by 2\nthe Department. 3\n(b) D ESIGNATION.—The board established by sub-4\nsection (a) shall be known as the ‘‘Artificial Intelligence 5\nAdvisory Board’’ (in this section the ‘‘Board’’). 6\n(c) COMPOSITION.—The Board shall be composed of 7\nsuch members as the Secretary selects from among those 8\nthat the Secretary considers experts in the field of artifi-9\ncial intelligence or other matters the Secretary considers 10\nrelevant to the purpose of the Board as described in sub-11\nsection (a). 12\nSEC. 7. EMPLOYEE MATTERS. 13\n(a) CONFLICT OF INTEREST.—No officer or employee 14\nof the Department may participate in any particular mat-15\nter in which that officer or employee has a financial inter-16\nest. 17\n(b) F INANCIAL INTERESTS.—No officer or employee 18\nof the Department may own or hold a controlling financial 19\ninterest in any entity regulated by the Department. 20\n(c) P OST-EMPLOYMENT.—No former officer or em-21\nployee of the Department may represent any person before 22\nthe Department. 23\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n9 \n•S 5493 IS\nSEC. 8. PAUSE ON DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED ARTIFI-1\nCIAL INTELLIGENCE. 2\n(a) I N GENERAL.—During the period set forth in 3\nsubsection (b)— 4\n(1) each advanced artificial intelligence system 5\nshall be subject to a mandatory pause; and 6\n(2) no unreleased advanced artificial intel-7\nligence system may be deployed during this period. 8\n(b) PERIOD.—The period set forth in this subsection 9\nis the period beginning on the date of the enactment of 10\nthis Act and ending on the date on which the Secretary 11\ndetermines that— 12\n(1) the Department is fully staffed; and 13\n(2) the Department has promulgated the rules 14\ndescribed in subsection (c). 15\n(c) RULES DESCRIBED.—The rules described in this 16\nsubsection are rules that the Secretary determines are 17\nclear and ensure safe and secure development and deploy-18\nment of artificial intelligence. Such rules shall include the 19\nfollowing: 20\n(1) Requirements for entities developing artifi-21\ncial intelligence to report pre-development plans to 22\nthe Department. 23\n(2) Monitoring and evaluation throughout the 24\nadvanced artificial intelligence system development 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n10 \n•S 5493 IS\nand deployment process, including in the post-de-1\nployment period. 2\n(3) Auditing to evaluate and improve organiza-3\ntional safety practices relating to artificial intel-4\nligence development. 5\n(4) Final pre-deployment approval before any 6\nadvanced artificial intelligence system is released to 7\nthe public. 8\nSEC. 9. PROHIBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS. 9\n(a) P ROHIBITION ON ARTIFICIAL SUPERINTEL-10\nLIGENCE.—No person may develop, deploy (either inter-11\nnally or externally), acquire, possess, fund, import, or 12\ntransfer artificial superintelligence or artificial intelligence 13\nsystems that display one or more superintelligence pre-14\ncursor characteristics, including any elements sufficient to 15\nreconstruct the artificial superintelligence or artificial in-16\ntelligence system’s capabilities. 17\n(b) F ORESEEABLE MODIFICATION.—No person may 18\ndeploy (either internally or externally), release, transfer, 19\nor import an artificial intelligence system, including any 20\nelements sufficient to reconstruct the system’s capabilities, 21\nthat may be foreseeably modified to produce artificial 22\nsuperintelligence or superintelligence precursor character-23\nistics. 24\n(c) MONITORING.— 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n11 \n•S 5493 IS\n(1) I N GENERAL .—The Department shall mon-1\nitor advanced artificial intelligence systems and sys-2\ntems distilled from advanced artificial intelligence 3\nsystems, including by conducting evaluations during 4\npre-training, mid-training, post-training, and post- 5\ndeployment periods, for artificial superintelligence 6\nand superintelligence precursor characteristics. 7\n(2) ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY PRACTICES .—The 8\nDepartment shall also monitor organizational safety 9\npractices relating to safe artificial intelligence devel-10\nopment and deployment. 11\n(d) PRE-DEPLOYMENT APPROVAL.— 12\n(1) L IMITATION.—No person may deploy, re-13\nlease, import, or transfer an advanced artificial intel-14\nligence system before receiving a pre-deployment ap-15\nproval from the Department. 16\n(2) I NSPECTIONS.—In determining whether to 17\ngrant a pre-deployment approval to a person for an 18\nadvanced artificial intelligence system, the Secretary 19\nshall— 20\n(A) inspect the system for characteristics 21\nthat pose a danger to the public, including arti-22\nficial superintelligence and superintelligence 23\nprecursor characteristics; and 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n12 \n•S 5493 IS\n(B) withhold a pre-deployment approval if 1\ncharacteristics that pose a danger to the public 2\nare present. 3\nSEC. 10. ACTIONS AGAINST SYSTEMS EXHIBITING SUPER-4\nINTELLIGENCE PRECURSOR CHARACTERIS-5\nTICS. 6\n(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall take such ac-7\ntions as may be necessary to ensure that any artificial in-8\ntelligence system that the Secretary identifies as exhibiting 9\nsuperintelligence precursor characteristics is immediately 10\nsubject to a mandatory pause and sequestered from the 11\ninternet. 12\n(b) POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION.—The Secretary shall 13\ntake such actions as may be necessary to ensure that any 14\nsystem subject to a mandatory pause under subsection (a) 15\nis rendered inoperative before the date that is 30 days 16\nafter the date on which the Secretary makes the identifica-17\ntion described in such subsection with respect to such sys-18\ntem, if the Secretary cannot verify that the system no 19\nlonger exhibits superintelligence precursor characteristics. 20\n(c) D ESTRUCTION REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary 21\nshall take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that 22\nany artificial intelligence system that the Secretary identi-23\nfies as an artificial superintelligence is immediately ren-24\ndered inoperative. 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n13 \n•S 5493 IS\nSEC. 11. DISCLOSURE. 1\nAny person who discovers an artificial superintel-2\nligence, or an artificial intelligence system that possesses 3\nsuperintelligence precursor characteristics, shall submit to 4\nthe Secretary notice of the discovery within 24 hours. 5\nSEC. 12. CHARTERS FOR ADVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTEL-6\nLIGENCE. 7\n(a) AUTHORITY TO ISSUE.—The Secretary may issue 8\nto a person a charter to develop or distribute an advanced 9\nartificial intelligence model. 10\n(b) CHARTER REQUIRED.—No person may develop or 11\ndistribute an advanced artificial intelligence model without 12\na charter issued by the Secretary under subsection (a). 13\n(c) C HARTER APPLICATION.—A person seeking a 14\ncharter issued under subsection (a) shall submit to the 15\nSecretary an application therefor at such time, in such 16\nmanner, and containing such information as the Secretary 17\nmay require. 18\n(d) AGREEMENT.—In requesting a charter under this 19\nsection and as a condition on maintaining such charter, 20\na person shall agree— 21\n(1) to give the Secretary full access to such ad-22\nvanced artificial intelligence systems, processes, 23\nstaff, and physical infrastructure of the person as 24\nthe Secretary considers appropriate to enforce the 25\nrequirements of this Act; and 26\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n14 \n•S 5493 IS\n(2) in any case in which the charter is revoked 1\nunder paragraph (1) of section 13(d) due to a find-2\ning of a violation and the finding has not been over-3\nturned pursuant to an appeal under paragraph (2) 4\nof such section, the person forfeits their intellectual 5\nproperty and assets to ensure the safe and complete 6\ndestruction of all systems and hardware related to 7\nthe violation. 8\nSEC. 13. PENALTIES. 9\n(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 10\n(1) C OVERED ENTITY .—The term ‘‘covered en-11\ntity’’ means a person with a charter issued under 12\nsection 12(a). 13\n(2) C OVERED POLICYMAKING INDIVIDUAL .— 14\nThe term ‘‘covered policymaking individual’’ means 15\nan individual who is employed in a policymaking role 16\nat a covered entity, or performs policymaking func-17\ntions at a covered entity. 18\n(3) R OGUE ACTOR .—The term ‘‘rogue actor’’ 19\nmeans an individual who is not employed by or oth-20\nerwise affiliated with a covered entity. 21\n(b) CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR POLICYMAKING INDI-22\nVIDUALS OR ROGUE ACTORS.—Any covered policymaking 23\nindividual or rogue actor who recklessly violates section 24\n8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder shall be fined 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n15 \n•S 5493 IS\nunder title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for 1\nnot more than 20 years. 2\n(c) P ENALTIES FOR NON-POLICYMAKING INDIVID-3\nUALS.— 4\n(1) I N GENERAL .—Any individual who is not a 5\ncovered policymaking individual who recklessly vio-6\nlates section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated 7\nthereunder, shall be barred from employment in the 8\nartificial intelligence industry for a period of 10 9\nyears. 10\n(2) A PPEAL.—An individual who is not a cov-11\nered policymaking individual who is found to have 12\nrecklessly violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule pro-13\nmulgated thereunder, may submit to the Secretary a 14\nrequest to review such finding and the Secretary, 15\nupon review of the finding, may overturn the find-16\ning. 17\n(3) WAIVER FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS .—The Sec-18\nretary may waive paragraph (1) for an individual de-19\nscribed in such paragraph if the Secretary deter-20\nmines that— 21\n(A) the individual submitted to the Sec-22\nretary information about a violation of section 23\n8, 9, or 12; and 24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n16 \n•S 5493 IS\n(B) doing so is consistent with the purpose 1\nset forth in section 4(b). 2\n(d) REVOCATION OF CHARTERS.— 3\n(1) IN GENERAL .—The Secretary shall revoke a 4\ncharter issued under section 12(a) if the Secretary 5\nfinds that the person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or 6\na rule promulgated thereunder. 7\n(2) APPEAL.—A person whose charter has been 8\nrevoked under paragraph (1) pursuant to a finding 9\nthat the person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule 10\npromulgated thereunder, may submit to the United 11\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit a re-12\nquest for review of the finding and the Court may 13\nuphold or overturn the finding. 14\n(3) RECEIVERSHIP.—If the Court receives a re-15\nquest from a person under paragraph (2) to review 16\na finding, the Court may, at the request of the per-17\nson, place the intellectual property of the person in 18\na receivership until the Court has completed the re-19\nview and the Secretary has ensured all artificial 20\nsuperintelligences or artificial intelligence systems 21\ndisplaying superintelligence precursor characteristics 22\nhave been rendered inoperative. 23\n(4) F ORFEITURE.—If the Court, under para-24\ngraph (2), upholds a finding that a person violated 25\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n17 \n•S 5493 IS\nsection 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated there-1\nunder, the intellectual property and assets of the 2\nperson shall be subject to forfeiture by the Federal 3\nGovernment to ensure the safe and complete de-4\nstruction of all systems and hardware related to the 5\nviolation. 6\nSEC. 14. PROHIBITION AGAINST RETALIATION. 7\n(a) D EFINITION OF COVERED INDIVIDUAL.—In this 8\nsection, the term ‘‘covered individual’’ includes, with re-9\nspect to an employer, the following: 10\n(1) An employee. 11\n(2) A former employee. 12\n(3) An independent contractor. 13\n(4) A former independent contractor. 14\n(b) PROHIBITION.—No employer may, directly or in-15\ndirectly, discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, blacklist, 16\nharass, or in any other manner discriminate against a cov-17\nered individual in the terms and conditions of employment 18\nor post-employment of the covered individual (or the terms 19\nand conditions of work provided by the covered individual 20\nas an independent contractor) because of any lawful act 21\ndone by the covered individual— 22\n(1) in providing information to the Department, 23\na law enforcement agency, or any member of Con-24\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n18 \n•S 5493 IS\ngress or any committee of Congress regarding a vio-1\nlation of this Act; 2\n(2) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in 3\nany investigation or judicial or administrative action, 4\nor any investigation of Congress, based upon or re-5\nlating to the information described in paragraph (1); 6\nor 7\n(3) in providing information to a person with 8\nsupervisory authority over the covered individual at 9\nthe employer of the covered individual, or another 10\nindividual working at the employer whom the cov-11\nered individual reasonably believes has the authority 12\nto investigate, discover, or terminate the misconduct 13\nor take any other action to address the misconduct. 14\nSEC. 15. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND POLICY. 15\n(a) C OORDINATION.—The Secretary of Artificial In-16\ntelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State shall 17\npursue international agreements and allied coordination to 18\nprevent the development of artificial superintelligence. 19\n(b) P OLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United 20\nStates to prevent the development of artificial superintel-21\nligence globally, which may include export controls on arti-22\nficial intelligence computing infrastructure. 23\nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS\n\n19 \n•S 5493 IS\nSEC. 16. FEDERAL FUNDING. 1\nNo Federal funds shall be used for any activities that 2\nviolate section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated there-3\nunder, except that the Department of Artificial Intel-4\nligence may use Federal funding for research relating to 5\ndefensive cybersecurity measures that utilizes artificial in-6\ntelligence systems that have the characteristics described 7\nunder section 3(6)(B). 8\nÆ \nVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:06 Sep 24, 2026 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 E:\\BILLS\\S5493.IS S5493ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS', 'pages': 19, 'doc_id': '3461292', 'truncated': False, 'extraction': 'source-pdf-text', 'source_url': 'https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/s5493/BILLS-119s5493is.pdf', 'observed_at': '2026-10-04T00:40:56.944585+00:00', 'content_hash': '358f72dfc3c2ede7378123f0468e8fe312e1cce2d6bffbb00b090b692079bbbe'}}

Collection history starts with our observations; it is not complete legislative amendment history.

Source selection: artificial intelligence. Observed 2026-10-13T01:30:17.415547+00:00.

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Notice Federal · NIST

RFI on Future Needs for Medical Metrology and Standards for Medical Imaging Devices Diagnostics and Therapy

Source ID: NIST-2026-0133-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-22

Source document type: Notice

Source comment close: 2026-12-01T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

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Federal Register document: 2026–19147

Source selection: artificial intelligence. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Proposed Rule Federal · GSA

General Services Administration Acquisition Regulation; GSAR Implementation of Executive Order 14275, FSS Ordering Procedures (GSAR Case 2026-G501)

Source ID: GSA-GSAR-2026-0563-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-22

Source document type: Proposed Rule

Source comment close: 2026-10-23T03:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

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Federal Register document: 2026-19331

Source selection: defense procurement. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Other Federal · CMS

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Temporary Moratoria on Certain Agent and Broker Registration to Participate in the Exchanges CMS-9872-IFC

Source ID: CMS-2026-3202-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-22

Source document type: Other

Source comment close: 2026-09-24T03:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

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Source selection: research and development tax credit. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Proposed Rule Federal · SEC

Proxy Solicitation Modernization

Source ID: SEC-2026-5848-0001 · Posted: 2026-09-21

Source document type: Proposed Rule

Source comment close: 2026-11-21T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

Federal Register document: 2026-19259

Source selection: space launch. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Notice Federal · PHMSA

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Hazardous Materials

Source ID: PHMSA-2026-1981-0002 · Posted: 2026-09-21

Source document type: Notice

Source comment close: 2026-12-22T04:59:59Z. Verify time, amendments and whether submissions remain open on the official source.

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Federal Register document: 2026-19276

Source selection: autonomous systems. Observed 2026-10-13T01:29:06.434968+00:00.

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Legislative data: LegiScan, CC BY 4.0. Selected, combined and formatted by Defense Tech Base.

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